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Ruling Below: (Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), cert granted 126 S. Ct.
1314, 74 USLW 3471 [2006]).
The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (PBABA), 18 U.S.C.A. 1531, imposed criminal and
civil liability upon any physician who committed a partial-birth abortion, in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce, unless it was necessary to save the life of the mother. Four
physicians challenged the constitutionality of the PBABA as contrary to the Supreme Court's
holding in Stenberg v. Carhart. After a Nebraska federal district judge found the statute
unconstitutional on several grounds, the Attorney General appealed to the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit. The Eighth Circuit held that the PBABA was unconstitutional because it
failed to include an exception for the health of the mother, as required by Stenberg v. Carhart.
Question Presented: Whether, notwithstanding Congress's determination that a health
exception was unnecessary to preserve the health of the mother, the PBABA is invalid because it
lacks a health exception or is otherwise unconstitutional on its face.
LeRoy CARHART, M.D., et al.,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
V.
Alberto GONZALES, Attorney General of the United States, et. al.,
Defendants, Appellants
United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit
Decided July 8, 2005
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
BYE, Circuit Judge:
This case presents a challenge to the federal
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003,
Pub.L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531). The day the
President signed the Act into law, plaintiffs
filed suit in the United States District Court
for the District of Nebraska seeking an
injunction against enforcement of the Act.
After a trial, the district court held the Act
unconstitutional on several grounds. The
government appeals. We affirm the
judgment of the district court.
I
A
In 2000, the Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S.
914, 120 S.Ct. 2597, 147 L.Ed.2d 743
(2000), which found Nebraska's partial-birth
abortion ban unconstitutional for two
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separate reasons. First, the Court determined
the law was unconstitutional because it did
not contain an exception to preserve the
health of the mother. Second, the Court
determined the law was worded so broadly it
covered the vast majority of late-term
abortions and thus imposed an undue burden
on the right to abortion itself.
In the eight years before the Court's decision
in Stenberg, at least thirty states passed laws
banning partial-birth abortions. See id at
983, 120 S.Ct. 2597 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). In 1996 and 1997, Congress
enacted prohibitions on partial-birth
abortions, however, President Clinton
vetoed them. Id. at 994 n. 11, 120 S.Ct. 2597
(Thomas, J., dissenting). In 2003, Congress
enacted, and President George W. Bush
signed, the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act
of 2003. The Act exposes "[a]ny physician
who, in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce, knowingly performs a partial-
birth abortion and thereby kills a human
fetus" to up to two years of imprisonment.
18 U.S.C. § 1531(a). The Act goes on to
define a "partial-birth abortion" as an
abortion in which the person performing the
abortion:
(A) deliberately and intentionally
vaginally delivers a living fetus until,
in the case of a head first
presentation, the entire fetal head is
outside the body of the mother, or, in
the case of a breech presentation, any
part of the fetal trunk past the navel
is outside the body of the mother, for
the purpose of performing an overt
act that the person knows will kill
the partially delivered living fetus;
and
(B) performs the overt act, other than
completion of delivery, that kills the
partially delivered living fetus.--Id.
§1531(b)(1).
The Act contains an exception allowing the
performance of "a partial-birth abortion that
is necessary to save the life of the mother."
Id. § 1531(a). The Act does not, however,
contain an exception for the preservation of
the health of the mother.
Presumably recognizing that the Act is
similar (though not identical) to the
Nebraska law found unconstitutional in
Stenberg, Congress made several findings
and declarations in the Act. Congress
"flound] and declare[d]" that "under well-
settled Supreme Court jurisprudence, the
United States Congress is not bound to
accept the same factual findings that the
Supreme Court was bound to accept in
Stenberg." Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of
2003 § 2(8), 117 Stat. at 1202. Congress
concluded that a "moral, medical, and
ethical consensus exists that the practice of
performing a partial-birth abortion is a
gruesome and inhumane procedure that is
never medically necessary and should be
prohibited." § 2(1), 117 Stat. at 1201. In
addition to determining there is "substantial
evidence" that partial-birth abortions are
never medically necessary, Congress also
concluded partial-birth abortions "pose[ ]
serious risks to the health of the mother
undergoing the procedure." §§ 2(13), 2(14),
117 Stat. At 1203-04.
After a trial, the district court found the Act
unconstitutional on two separate grounds.
First, the district court concluded Congress's
finding regarding a medical consensus was
unreasonable and thus the Act was
unconstitutional due to its lack of health
exception. Second, the district court
concluded the Act covered the most
common late-term abortion procedure and
thus imposed an undue burden on the right
to an abortion.
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BThe procedures in question in this case are
used during late-term abortions and we
therefore must, for context, present some
basic information regarding these
procedures. There are three primary methods
of late-term abortions: medical induction;
dilation and evacuation (D & E); and
dilation and extraction (D & X). In a
medical induction, formerly the most
common method of second-trimester
abortion, a physician uses medication to
induce premature labor. Stenberg, 530 U.S.
at 924, 120 S.Ct. 2597. In a D & E, now the
most common procedure, the physician
causes dilation of the woman's cervix and
then "the physician reaches into the
woman's uterus with an instrument, grasps
an extremity of the fetus, and pulls."
Women's Med Profl Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d
436, 439 (6th Cir. 2003). "When the fetus
lodges in the cervix, the traction between the
grasping instrument and the cervix causes
dismemberment and eventual death,
although death may occur prior to
dismemberment." Id. This process is
repeated until the entire fetus has been
removed.
D & X and a process called intact D & E are
what are "now widely known as partial birth
abortion." Id. In these procedures, the fetus
is removed "intact" in a single pass. If the
fetus presents head first, the physician
collapses the skull of the fetus and then
removes the "intact" fetus. Stenberg, 530
U.S. at 927, 120 S.Ct. 2597. This is what is
known as an intact D & E. If the fetus
presents feet first, the physician "pulls the
fetal body through the cervix, collapses the
skull, and extracts the fetus through the
cervix." Id. This is the D & X procedure.
"Despite the technical differences" between
an intact D & E and a D & X, they are
"sufficiently similar for us to use the terms
interchangeably." Id. at 928, 120 S.Ct. 2597.
II
As a preliminary matter, although the
plaintiffs purported to bring a facial
challenge to the Act, the district court
expressed confusion over whether its
judgment declared the Act facially
unconstitutional or unconstitutional as
applied to the plaintiffs. See Carhart v.
Ashcroft, 331 F.Supp.2d 805, 1042-47
(D.Neb. 2004) (stating the district court
"do[es] not know" if its ruling was facial or
as applied and leaving "that for others to
determine"). This is a question of law and
we therefore review it de novo. See, e.g.,
United States v. Jefifries, 405 F.3d 682, 684
(8th Cir. 2005). The traditional standard for
evaluating a facial challenge was set forth in
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 107
S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). In
Salerno, the Supreme Court explained that a
"facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of
course, the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must
establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the Act would be valid." Id. at
745, 107 S.Ct. 2095. In Stenberg, however,
the Supreme Court struck down Nebraska's
partial-birth abortion ban as facially
unconstitutional without applying the
Salerno standard. In fact, the approach taken
in Stenberg was fundamentally inconsistent
with Salerno's ."no set of circumstances"
test in that it regarded rarity of the need for a
particular procedure as "not highly
relevant." Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 934, 120
S.Ct. 2597. The Salerno test is also
inconsistent with the general undue burden
analysis for abortion statutes set forth in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992).
This has led the vast majority of circuit
courts to apply these abortion-specific
standards in place of Salerno. See Planned
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Parenthood ofN New England v. Heed, 390
F.3d 53, 57-59 (1st Cir. 2004) (collecting
cases), cert. granted sub nom. Ayotte v.
Planned Parenthood, 125 S.Ct. 2294, 161
L.Ed.2d 1088 (May 23, 2005); Richmond
Med Ctr. for Women v. Hicks, 409 F.3d
619, 627-28 (4th Cir. 2005) (same). We
have previously declined to apply the "no
set of circumstances" test in the context of
facial challenges to abortion restrictions in
Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v.
Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1458 (8th Cir. 1995),
where we explained we would "follow what
the Supreme Court actually did-rather than
what it failed to say" and thus applied
Casey's undue burden test. We will again
follow what the Supreme Court "actually
did" and apply the test from Stenberg rather
than the one from Salerno. We therefore join
every circuit that has addressed the question.
See Hicks, 409 F.3d at 628; Planned
Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden, 376
F.3d 908, 921 n. 10 (9th Cir. 2004); Planned
Parenthood of the Rocky Mountains Servs.,
Corp. v. Owens, 287 F.3d 910, 919 (10th
Cir. 2002). Thus, if the Act fails the
Stenberg test, it must be held facially
unconstitutional.
III
We begin our analysis with the Supreme
Court's decision in Stenberg. That case has
engendered some disagreement as to the
proper standard for evaluating the necessity
of a health exception. The proper reading of
Stenberg is a question of law and therefore
is reviewed de novo. See, e.g., Jeffies, 405
F.3d at 684. The government argues
Stenberg merely examined the specific
factual record before the Court, and thus a
health exception is only required when a
banned procedure is actually "necessary, in
appropriate medical judgment, for the
preservation of the health of the mother."
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930, 120 S.Ct. 2597
(internal quotations omitted). Plaintiffs, in
contrast, contend that "where substantial
medical authority supports the proposition
that banning a particular abortion procedure
could endanger women's health, Casey
requires the statute to include a health
exception when the procedure is
"'necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment, for the preservation of the life or
health of the mother.""' Stenberg, 530 U.S.
at 938, 120 S.Ct. 2597 (quoting Casey, 505
U.S. at 879, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (quoting Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35
L.Ed.2d 147 (1973))).
The government argues that Stenberg
embodies a lenient standard, and further
urges that congressional factfinding must be
afforded deference under Turner
Broadcasting v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 114
S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994) (Turner
I), and Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 520
U.S. 180, 117 S.Ct. 1174, 137 L.Ed.2d 369
(1997) (Turner II). The government
contends that because (in its opinion)
Congress is afforded deference in
factfinding as a general proposition, the
district court's adoption of the "substantial
medical authority" standard amounts to an
implicit overruling of the Turner line of
cases. According to the government, the
"substantial medical authority" standard
"must [therefore] be understood as[,] at
most[,] a rule of decision in the absence of
congressional findings, not as a basis for
disregarding such findings." Br. of
Appellant at 33. The government's
argument, however, fundamentally
misconstrues the threshold issue, for our
task lies not in identifying who gets to
decide, but rather in identifying the precise
question that must be answered.
The other end of the spectrum on potential
readings of Stenberg is exemplified by a
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recent decision in which the Fourth Circuit
addressed Stenberg's health exception
requirement standard in a case involving a
state partial-birth abortion statute. Hicks,
409 F.3d at 625-26. The Fourth Circuit held
that Stenberg "established the health
exception requirement as a per se
constitutional rule." Id. at 625. The court
explained that "[t]his rule is based on
substantial medical authority (from a broad
array of sources) recognized by the Supreme
Court, and this body of medical authority
does not have to be reproduced in every
subsequent challenge to a 'partial birth
abortion' statute lacking a health exception,"
and therefore all statutes regulating partial-
birth abortion must contain a health
exception. Id. Several district courts have, at
least implicitly, taken this position as well.
See, e.g., Reproductive Health Servs. of
Planned Parenthood v. Nixon, 325
F.Supp.2d 991, 994-95 (W.D.Mo. 2004);
WomanCare of Southfield, P.C. v.
Granholm, 143 F.Supp.2d 849, 855
(E.D.Mich. 2001); Summit Med Assocs. v.
Siegelman, 130 F.Supp.2d 1307, 1314
(M.D.Ala. 2001); Daniel v. Underwood, 102
F.Supp.2d 680, 684 (S.D.W.Va. 2000).
We agree with the Fourth Circuit that
Stenberg establishes a per se constitutional
rule in that the constitutional requirement of
a health exception applies to all abortion
statutes, without regard to precisely how the
statute regulates abortion. See Heed, 390
F.3d at 59 (applying Stenberg to parental
notification law). As the Ninth Circuit
recently explained: "Any abortion regulation
must contain adequate provision for a
woman to terminate her pregnancy if it
poses a threat to her life or her health."
Wasden, 376 F.3d at 922. While Stenberg's
health exception rule undoubtedly applies to
all abortion statutes, such a proposition does
not explain how to evaluate whether a given
restriction poses a constitutionally
significant threat to the mother's health.
We believe the appropriate question is
whether "substantial medical authority"
supports the medical necessity of the banned
procedure. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 938,
120 S.Ct. 2597; id at 948, 120 S.Ct. 2597
(O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Planned
Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320
F.Supp.2d 957, 1033 (N.D.Cal. 2004); Nat'l
Abortion Fed'n v. Ashcroft, 330 F.Supp.2d
436, 487-90 (S.D.N.Y.2004); Carhart, 331
F.Supp.2d at 1008. The Stenberg Court
determined medical necessity (as that term
was used in Casey ) does not refer to "an
absolute necessity or to absolute proof."
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 937, 120 S.Ct. 2597.
Rather, "appropriate medical judgment"
must "embody the judicial need to tolerate
responsible differences of medical opinion."
Id. Recognition of this principle was driven
by the Court's concern that "the division of
medical opinion about the matter at most
means uncertainty, a factor that signals the
presence of risk, not its absence." Id. Thus,
when "substantial medical authority"
supports the medical necessity of a
procedure in some instances, a health
exception is constitutionally required. In
effect, we believe when a lack of consensus
exists in the medical community, the
Constitution requires legislatures to err on
the side of protecting women's health by
including a health exception.
In dissent, both Justice Kennedy and Justice
Thomas criticized the Stenberg majority for
imposing what they believed was a high
burden on legislatures. Justice Kennedy
commented that by disagreeing with
Nebraska, the Court was effectively
"[r]equiring Nebraska to defer to Dr.
Carhart's judgment [which was] no different
from forbidding Nebraska from enacting a
ban at all; for it is now Dr. Leroy Carhart
who sets abortion policy." Id. at 965, 120
7
S.Ct. 2597 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice
Thomas characterized the majority opinion
as requiring a health exception "because
there is a 'division of opinion among some
medical experts"' Id. at 1009, 120 S.Ct.
2597 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting id at
936-37, 120 S.Ct. 2597). "In other words,
unless a State can conclusively establish that
an abortion procedure is no safer than other
procedures, the State cannot regulate that
procedure without including a health
exception." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Although the Stenberg majority did not
believe the rule it announced gave individual
doctors an absolute veto over legislatures, it
emphasized that a health exception is
required where "substantial medical
authority" supports the medical necessity of
a procedure. Id. at 938, 120 S.Ct. 2597. Such
language would be rendered essentially
meaningless if we accepted the
government's reading of the case, a reading
that would conform to neither the majority's
reasoning nor to the dissenters' concerns. In
sum, we conclude Stenberg requires the
inclusion of a health exception whenever
"substantial medical authority" supports the




Having identified the proper question, we
now turn to determining how this question
should be answered. The government argues
the Turner line of cases requires courts to
"'accord substantial deference to the
predictive judgments of Congress,"' and the
"sole obligation" of reviewing courts "is 'to
assure that, in formulating its judgments,
Congress has drawn reasonable inferences
based on substantial evidence."' Turner II,
520 U.S. at 195, 117 S.Ct. 1174 (quoting
Turner I, 512 U.S. at 665-66, 114 S.Ct.
2445). Thus, under the government's
formulation, we would be bound by
Congress's determination that a "moral,
medical, and ethical consensus exists that
the practice of performing a partial-birth
abortion" is never medically necessary, so
long as this apparent factual determination is
reasonable and supported by substantial
evidence.
The government's argument is predicated on
an erroneous assumption: that the
"substantial medical authority" standard is a
question of fact. While questions of law and
questions of fact sometimes can be neatly
separated, such questions are often
intermingled and identified as so-called
mixed questions of fact and law. See, e.g.,
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696,
116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996).
Whether a partial-birth abortion is medically
necessary in a given instance would be a
question of fact; for in any given instance it
would be either true or false that a partial-
birth abortion is medically necessary. There
may be conflicting expert opinions, but only
one can actually be right in any given set of
medical circumstances. In contrast, whether
the record in a particular lawsuit reflects the
existence of "substantial medical authority"
supporting the medical necessity of such
procedures is a question that is different in
kind; it asks only whether there is a certain
quantum of evidence to support a particular
answer, not which of the divergent opinions
is ultimately correct. Reviewing the record
to determine if the evidence presented
suffices to support the conclusion reached
by the lower court is typically treated as a
matter of law. See, e.g., Howard v.
Massanari, 255 F.3d 577, 580 (8th Cir.
2001) (applying de novo review of the
Social Security Commissioner's conclusion
despite prior district court review); United
States v. Thompson, 285 F.3d 731, 733 (8th
8
Cir. 2002) (reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence de novo ). We must, of course,
examine the evidence, but the legal question
inherent in this inquiry is whether such
record evidence constitutes "substantial
medical authority" in a given case.
This case differs slightly from the typical
case in which we review the evidence to
determine if the record is sufficient to
support the lower court's conclusion. Under
the "substantial medical authority" standard,
our review of the record is effectively
limited to determining whether substantial
evidence exists to support the medical
necessity of partial-birth abortions without
regard to the factual conclusions drawn from
the record by the lower court (or, in this
case, Congress). Thus, Stenberg created a
standard in which the ultimate factual
conclusion is irrelevant. Under this standard,
we must examine the record to determine if
"substantial medical authority" supports the
medical necessity of the banned procedures.
If it does, then a health exception is
constitutionally required. If the need for a
health exception is not supported by
"substantial medical authority," by contrast,
then the state is free to impose the restriction
without providing a health exception.
We believe an example from the Supreme
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence is
instructive here. In New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11
L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), the Court held that the
First Amendment "prohibits a public official
from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct
unless he proves that the statement was
made with 'actual malice'-that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not." Id.
at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. 710. To meet this
burden, the public official must show actual
malice by clear and convincing evidence.
See, e.g., Campbell v. Citizens for an Honest
Gov't, Inc., 255 F.3d 560, 569 (8th Cir.
2001). In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of
the United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 104
S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984), the
Court faced the question of whether Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), which makes
facts subject only to review for clear error,
was the appropriate standard for reviewing a
finding of actual malice. Id. at 487, 104
S.Ct. 1949. An individual's state of mind is a
question of historical fact and would thus
normally be reviewed only for clear error.
See, e.g., Hickey v. Reeder, 12 F.3d 754,
756-57 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that state of
mind is a question of fact that is reviewed
for clear error); see also Bose, 466 U.S. at
498 n. 15, 104 S.Ct. 1949 (noting that in
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 170, 99
S.Ct. 1635, 60 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979), the
Court had referred "in passing" to actual
malice as "ultimate fact"). The Court
concluded, however, that the First
Amendment requires independent appellate
review. The Bose Court explained that
"[j]udges, as expositors of the Constitution,
must independently decide whether the
evidence in the record is sufficient to cross
the constitutional threshold." Id. at 511, 104
S.Ct. 1949. The Court further stated that
"independent inquiries of this kind are
familiar under the settled principle that in
cases in which there is a claim of denial of
rights under the Federal Constitution, this
Court is not bound by the conclusions of
lower courts, but will reexamine the
evidentiary basis on which those
conclusions are founded." Id at 510, 104
S.Ct. 1949 (internal quotations and
alterations omitted). Thus, despite the fact
that an individual's mental state is a question
of pure historical fact, a determination of
whether the record supports the finding of
actual malice is a question of law. See, e.g.,
Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v.
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Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 685, 109 S.Ct.
2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989); Mercer v.
City of Cedar Rapids, 308 F.3d 840, 849
(8th Cir. 2002); see also Bose, 466 U.S. at
499, 104 S.Ct. 1949 (explaining the "New
York Times rule emphasizes the need for an
appellate court to make an independent
examination of the entire record"). The same
reasoning applies here. While judges under
Bose must determine whether clear and
convincing evidence of an individual's state
of mind exists in an effort to protect that
individual's First Amendment rights, here
we must examine the record to determine
whether "substantial medical authority"
supports the need for a health exception so
as to guard against the denial of another
constitutional right.
As a result, the government's argument
regarding Turner deference is irrelevant to
the case at hand. Our review is based on the
record and is guided, as described below, by
the legal conclusions reached by the
Supreme Court in prior cases. Therefore, we
need not address the government's assertions
that federal courts must defer to
congressional factfinding.
B
Courts engage in different types of
factfinding, as the facts that they find can be
either of an adjudicatory or legislative
nature. See Qualley v. Clo-Tex Int'l, Inc.,
212 F.3d 1123, 1128 (8th Cir. 2000).
Adjudicatory facts are those relevant only to
the particular parties involved in the case.
United States v. Gould, 536 F.2d 216, 219
(8th Cir. 1976). Classic examples are "'who
did what, when, where, how and with what
motive or intent."' Id. (quoting 2 Kenneth
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 15.03,
at 353 (1958)). In contrast, legislative facts
are those that have salience beyond the
specific parties to the suit. Qualley, 212 F.3d
at 1128. The medical necessity of particular
abortion procedures clearly falls into this
latter category, as such procedures are either
sometimes medically necessary or they are
not: the answer to this question does not
vary from place to place or party to party.
While lower court conclusions drawn from
the same body of evidence may vary from
individual case to individual case, appellate
courts can impose uniformity within their
jurisdictions by according no deference to a
lower court's record-based conclusions.
Indeed, adopting a deferential posture in
such circumstances could lead to the absurd
result where two district courts within the
same circuit (perhaps even within the same
state) might examine the same body of
evidence and reach different conclusions as
to the medical necessity of the partial-birth
abortion procedures, but we would be forced
to affirm both because the question is a close
one. See Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857,
883-84 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Posner, J.,
dissenting), vacated and remanded, 530
U.S. 1271, 120 S.Ct. 2738, 147 L.Ed.2d
1001 (2000); see also Lockhart v. McCree,
476 U.S. 162, 169 n. 3, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90
L.Ed.2d 137 (1986) (expressing doubt that
"legislative facts" are reviewed deferentially
because different courts can come to
different conclusions from the same
evidence). As Judge Easterbrook has
cogently explained for the Seventh Circuit,
the medical necessity of partial-birth
abortion "must be assessed at the level of
legislative fact, rather than adjudicative fact
determined by more than 650 district judges.
Only treating the matter as one of legislative
fact produces the nationally uniform
approach that Stenberg demands." A
Woman's Choice-E. Side Women's Clinic v.
Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 688 (7th Cir. 2002).
The Newman court recognized that
"[f]indings based on new evidence could
produce a new understanding, and thus a
10
different legal outcome. But if the issue is
one of legislative rather than adjudicative
fact, it is unsound to say that, on records
similar in nature, Wisconsin's law could be
valid and Indiana's law invalid, just because
different district judges reached different
conclusions about the inferences to be drawn
from the same body of statistical work." Id.;
see also Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 884 (en
banc) (Posner, J., dissenting). Thus,
although the Seventh Circuit prior to
Stenberg had affirmed a trial court's decision
upholding a partial-birth abortion ban based
on the trial court's conclusion that partial-
birth abortions are never medically
necessary, the Supreme Court vacated the
decision without regard to the specific facts
found by that particular trial court. See Hope
Clinic, 530 U.S. at 1271, 120 S.Ct. 2738. On
remand, the Seventh Circuit held the state
bans unconstitutional (in agreement with the
parties). See Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 249 F.3d
603, 604 (2001) (en banc) (decision on
remand) ("[B]oth Illinois and Wisconsin
have conceded that their partial-birth-
abortion statutes are unconstitutional under
the approach the Court adopted in Stenberg.
We agree with this assessment of Stenberg's
significance."). While we are hesitant to
read too much into the Supreme Court's
decision to vacate and remand Hope Clinic,
its decision, along with the Seventh Circuit's
comments regarding Stenberg's significance,
is suggestive of a need to achieve
constitutional uniformity through treatment
of the issue as one of legislative fact.
In the specific context of a ban on partial-
birth abortions, we join the reasoning of the
Fourth Circuit and some of the district
courts that have treated Stenberg as a per se
constitutional rule. In Stenberg, the Court
surveyed all of the available medical
evidence (including the formal district court
record, the district court records from other
partial-birth abortion cases, amicus
submissions, and some congressional
records) and determined that "substantial
medical authority" supported the need for a
health exception. "[T]his body of medical
authority does not have to be reproduced in
every subsequent challenge to a 'partial birth
abortion' statute lacking a health exception."
Hicks, 409 F.3d at 625. Neither we, nor
Congress, are free to disagree with the
Supreme Court's determination because the
Court's conclusions are final on matters of
constitutional law. See, e.g., Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437, 120 S.Ct.
2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000) ("Congress
may not legislatively supersede our
decisions interpreting and applying the
Constitution."); City of Boerne v. Flores,
521 U.S. 507, 517-21, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138
L.Ed.2d 624 (1997); Stell v. Savannah-
Chatham County Bd of Educ., 333 F.2d 55,
61 (5th Cir. 1964) ("[N]o inferior federal
court may refrain from acting as required by
[Brown v. Board of Education] even if such
a court should conclude that the Supreme
Court erred as to its facts or as to the law.").
And because the medical necessity of a
health exception is a question of legislative
fact, subsequent litigants need not relitigate
questions the Supreme Court has already
addressed. See, e. g., Hicks, 409 F.3d at 625;
N.J Citizen Action v. Edison Township, 797
F.2d 1250, 1268 (3d Cir. 1986) (Weis, J.,
dissenting) ("The constitutional facts
supporting a rule or doctrine must
necessarily carry precedential weight so that
government will be able to predict the
validity of their regulatory actions. Thus, in
large part the longevity of constitutional
facts may be attributed to the doctrine of
stare decisis and the important purposes that
principle serves."); Matthews v. Launius,
134 F.Supp. 684, 686-87 (D.Ark. 1955)
(recognizing that to succeed in a suit under
Brown, a plaintiff need not reprove Brown 's
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factual predicates).
This is not to say, however, that because the
Supreme Court concluded "substantial
medical authority" supported the need for a
health exception in 2000, legislatures are
forever constitutionally barred from enacting
partial-birth abortion bans. Rather, the
"substantial medical authority" test allows
for the possibility that the evidentiary
support underlying the need for a health
exception might be reevaluated under
appropriate circumstances. Medical
technology and knowledge is constantly
advancing, and it remains theoretically
possible that at some point (either through
an advance in knowledge or the
development of new techniques, for
example), the procedures prohibited by the
Act will be rendered obsolete. Should that
day ever come, legislatures might then be
able to rely on this new evidence to prohibit
partial-birth abortions without providing a
health exception.
V
Stenberg identified what some refer to as
"evidentiary circumstances" upon which the
Court purportedly relied in determining
whether "substantial medical authority"
supported the need for a health exception.
The Stenberg Court noted (1) the district
court's conclusion that D & X significantly
obviates health risks in certain
circumstances and a highly plausible record-
based explanation of why that might be so;
(2) a division of opinion among medical
experts regarding the procedure; and (3) an
absence of controlled medical studies that
address the safety and medical necessity of
the banned procedures. 530 U.S. at 936-37,
120 S.Ct. 2597. In evaluating the
government's case, we take Stenberg as the
baseline and then determine if the
government has proffered evidence
sufficient to distinguish the present situation
from Stenberg's "evidentiary
circumstances." If the government marshals
such evidence, we must then determine
whether the evidence on the other side
remains "substantial medical authority."
Because we conclude the government has
not adduced evidence distinguishing this
case from Stenberg, we need not attempt to
define the precise contours of "substantial
medical authority."
We know from Stenberg that "substantial
medical authority" supports the conclusion
that the banned procedures obviate health
risks in certain situations. For example, there
is "substantial medical authority" (in the
form of expert testimony and amici
submissions) that these procedures reduce
the risk of uterine perforation and cervical
laceration because they avoid significant
instrumentation and the presence of sharp
fetal bone fragments. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at
930-34, 120 S.Ct. 2597. There is also
evidence the procedure takes less time and
thus reduces blood loss and prolonged
exposure to anesthesia. Id. The banned
procedure may also eliminate the risk posed
by retained fetal tissue and embolism of
cerebral tissue into the woman's
bloodstream. Id. Moreover, there is evidence
regarding the health advantages the banned
procedures provide when the woman has
prior uterine scarring or when the fetus is
nonviable due to hydrocephaly. Id.
There is some evidence in the present record
indicating each of the advantages discussed
in Stenberg are incorrect and the banned
procedures are never medically necessary.
See Carhart, 331 F.Supp.2d at 822-51.
There were, however, such assertions in
Stenberg as well. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at
933-34, 120 S.Ct. 2597; id. at 964-66, 120
S.Ct. 2597 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Though the contrary evidence now comes
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from (some) different doctors, the substance
of this evidence does not distinguish this
case from Stenberg in any meaningful way.
To avoid Stenberg, the government cannot
simply claim Stenberg was wrongly decided,
for we are bound by the Supreme Court's
conclusions. The facts in Stenberg were
hotly contested, and simply asserting that
the other side should have prevailed
accomplishes nothing. Rather, to succeed,
the government must demonstrate that
relevant evidentiary circumstances (such as
the presence of a newfound medical
consensus or medical studies) have in fact
changed over time.
If one thing is clear from the record in this
case, it is that no consensus exists in the
medical community. The record is rife with
disagreement on this point, just as in
Stenberg. In fact, one of the government's
witnesses himself testified that no consensus
exists in the medical community and further
stated that there exists a "body of medical
opinion," including the "position[s] taken by
[the] American College of Obstetrics and
Gynecologists" (ACOG) and "a responsible
group of physicians," indicating that the
procedures are indeed sometimes medically
necessary. Carhart, 331 F.Supp.2d at 1012.
The lack of consensus also extends to
medical organizations. The American
Medical Association believes the banned
procedures to be medically unnecessary
while ACOG believes these procedures can
be the most appropriate in certain situations.
Id. at 843, 997. The Supreme Court relied on
the ACOG view in particular in Stenberg,
530 U.S. at 935-36, 120 S.Ct. 2597.
Moreover, the congressional findings quote
''a prominent medical association's"
conclusion that "there is no consensus
among obstetricians about its use." Partial
Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 § 2(14)(C),
117 Stat. at 1204 (internal quotations
omitted). In short, no medical consensus has
developed to support a different outcome.
See, e. g., Carhart, 331 F.Supp.2d at 1009
(concluding Congress's determination that a
consensus against the banned procedures
existed is unreasonable and not supported by
substantial evidence); Nat'l Abortion Fed'n,
330 F.Supp.2d at 488-89 (same); Planned
Parenthood Fed'n of Am., 320 F.Supp.2d at
1025 (same).
While the existence of disagreement among
medical experts has not changed, there has
been one new study on the safety of the
banned procedures. A recent study by Dr.
Stephen Chasen addressed the comparative
health effects of the D & X and D & E
procedures. Stephen T. Chasen et al.,
Dilation and evacuation at ? 20 weeks;
Comparison of operative techniques, 190
Am. J. of Obstetrics and Gynecology 1180
(2004). The study found no significant
difference in blood loss, procedure time, or
short-term complication rates between the
procedures. The government argues that
these conclusions reinforce Congress's
finding that the banned procedures are not
safer than other methods (while also
conceding that the conclusions militate
against Congress's finding that the banned
procedures have "serious" health risks). In
drawing its conclusions, however, the
government ignores the study's
methodology. The choice of procedure in
each case was not random, but was rather
"based on cervical dilation and fetal
position." Id. at 1181. Thus, the only real
conclusion that can be drawn from this new
study is that D & X is not inherently more
dangerous than D & E in situations where
the medical professional believes D & X to
be the most appropriate procedure. No
general conclusion regarding the medical
necessity of the banned procedures in any
given situation can be drawn from the study,
which neither conclusively supports the
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position that the banned procedures are
sometimes medically necessary, nor does it
conclusively support the position that they
are never medically necessary. The Chasen
study therefore detracts in no way from the
Supreme Court's prior conclusion, as there
are still no medical studies addressing the
medical necessity of the banned procedures.
We need not belabor the point. The record in
this case and the record in Stenberg are
similar in all significant respects. See Nat'l
Abortion Fed'n, 330 F.Supp.2d at 492
(explaining that the government's arguments
"all fail to meaningfully distinguish the
evidentiary circumstances present here from
those that Stenberg held required a health
exception to a ban on partial-birth
abortion"). There remains no consensus in
the medical community as to the safety and
medical necessity of the banned procedures.
There is a dearth of studies on the medical
necessity of the banned procedures. In the
absence of new evidence which would serve
to distinguish this record from the record
reviewed by the Supreme Court in Stenberg,
we are bound by the Supreme Court's
conclusion that "substantial medical
authority" supports the medical necessity of
a health exception. "As a court of law, [our
responsibility] is neither to devise ways in
which to circumvent the opinion of the
Supreme Court nor to indulge delay in the
full implementation of the Court's opinions.
Rather, our responsibility is to faithfully
follow its opinions, because that court is, by
constitutional design, vested with the
ultimate authority to interpret the
Constitution." Richmond Med. Ctr. for
Women v. Gilmore, 219 F.3d 376, 378 (4th
Cir. 2000) (Luttig, J., concurring). Because
the Act does not contain a health exception
exception, it is unconstitutional. We
therefore do not reach the district court's
conclusion of the Act imposing an undue
burden on a woman's right to have an
abortion.
VI
For the reasons stated above, the judgment
of the district court is affirmed.
14
Gonzales v. Planned Parenthood
(05-1382)
Ruling Below: (Planned Parenthood v. Gonzales, 435 F.3 1163 (9th Cir. 2006), cert granted 74
USLW 3629 [2006]).
The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (PBABA), 18 U.S.C.A. 1531, imposed criminal and
civil liability upon any physician who committed a partial-birth abortion, in or affecting
interstate or foreign commerce, unless it was necessary to save the life of the mother. Planned
Parenthood of America challenged the constitutionality of the PBABA as contrary to the
Supreme Court's holding in Stenberg v. Carhart. After a California federal district judge found
the statute unconstitutional on several grounds, the Attorney General appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit held that the PBABA was unconstitutional
because it failed to include an exception for the health of the mother, imposed an undue burden
on women's right to choose a previability abortion, was vague, and a permanent injunction
against the entire act was the only permissible remedy.
Questions Presented: Whether, notwithstanding Congress's determination that a health
exception was unnecessary to preserve the health of the mother, the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
Act of 2003 is invalid because it lacks a health exception or is otherwise unconstitutional on its
face.
PLANNED PARENTHOOD FEDERATION OF AMERICA, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
V.
Alberto R. GONZALES, Attorney General of the United States
Defendant, Appellant
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Decided January 31, 2006
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:
This appeal presents a challenge to the
constitutionality of the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub.L. No. 108-
105, 117 Stat. 1201 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
1531). We, like every other federal court
that has considered the question, conclude
that both the Constitution and the law as
15
established by the Supreme Court require us
to hold the Act unconstitutional. Unlike the
other courts, however, we do so after fully
considering the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of
N. New England, 126 S.Ct. 961, 163
L.Ed.2d 812 (2006). In light of Ayotte, we
conclude that the only appropriate remedy is
to enjoin enforcement of the Act and we
now affirm the district court's grant of a
permanent injunction.
[The court discussed background
information on post-first trimester abortion
methods, the statute, the litigation, and
treatment of the statute by other courts.]
[The court discussed the standard of review.
The court concluded that the questions of
whether the Act imposes an undue burden or
is unconstitutionally vague are legal issues
subject to de novo review, and the absence
of a health exception is facially
unconstitutional if it threatens the health of
even a few women.]
III. Analysis
We hold that the Act is unconstitutional for
three distinct reasons, each of which is
sufficient to justify the district court's
holding. First, the Act lacks the
constitutionally required health exception.
Second, it imposes an undue burden on
women's ability to obtain previability
abortions. Third, it is unconstitutionally
vague, depriving physicians of fair notice of
what it prohibits and encouraging arbitrary
enforcement. For reasons explained in
Section IV infra, we conclude that the
appropriate remedy is to enjoin the
enforcement of the Act. We therefore affirm
the district court's issuance of the permanent
injunction.
[The court argued that the Act is
uconstiutional because it lacks a health
exception.]
B. The Act is Unconstitutional Because It
Imposes an Undue Burden on Women's
Right to Choose a Previability Abortion
In addition to its lack of a health exception,
the Act suffers from other major deficiencies
that lead us to conclude that it is
unconstitutional, including the undue burden
it imposes on a woman's constitutional right
to choose to have an abortion before the
fetus is viable. The Constitution guarantees
a woman the right to choose to terminate a
previability pregnancy. Although the
Constitution firmly guarantees women that
right, the state may seek to protect its
interest in fetal life by regulating the means
by which abortions may be secured,
provided the regulations do not impose an
"undue burden" on a woman's ability to
obtain an abortion. An "'undue burden is ...
shorthand for the conclusion that a state
regulation has the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus."'
In Stenberg, the Court held that a Nebraska
statute regulating so-called "partial-birth
abortions" imposed an undue burden.
Without deciding the issue whether a statute
that outlawed only intact D & Es would be
unduly burdensome, the Stenberg court held
that an abortion ban that failed to
differentiate in its statutory language
between intact D & Es and non-intact D &
Es unquestionably constituted an undue
burden, for the obvious reason that it would
prohibit most second trimester abortions. As
part of its analysis, the Stenberg Court
provided legislatures with guidance about
how to draft statutes that would adequately
distinguish between the two forms of D & E.
The Court explained that a legislature can
make clear that a statute intended to regulate
only intact D & Es applies to that form of
the procedure only, by using language that
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"track[s] the medical differences between"
intact and non-intact D & Es or by providing
an express exception for the performance of
non-intact D & Es and other abortion
procedures....
When drafting the Act, however, Congress
deliberately chose not to follow the Court's
guidance. See Section IV infra. The Act's
definition of the prohibited procedures does
not attempt to track the medical differences
between intact D & E and other forms of D
& E, nor does it explicitly exclude non-
intact D & Es from its reach. Instead of
using either of these approaches for
accomplishing the objective the government
embraces in its brief-prohibiting only intact
D & Es, Congress defined the prohibited
procedure in a way that a number of doctors
have explained includes both intact and non-
intact D & Es, and that we likewise
conclude bans both forms of the procedure.
Because the Act, like the statute invalided in
Stenberg, would allow prosecutors to pursue
physicians who "use [non-intact] D & E
procedures, the most commonly used
method for performing previability second
trimester abortions" and would cause all
doctors performing those procedures to "fear
prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment,"
it too is unconstitutional....
i. The Act Encompasses Non-Intact D & E
Procedures
The government offers no explanation for
why Congress did not adopt either of the
two approaches outlined by the Court and
Justice O'Connor in Stenberg for legislating
a prohibition that is applicable only to the
intact D & E procedure. Rather, it asserts
that the federal statute differs from the
Nebraska statute invalidated in Stenberg in
three significant respects that collectively
make it clear that the Act applies only to that
form of the procedure. It argues that, as a
result, the Act is constitutional although the
Nebraska law was not. The differences in
statutory language to which the government
points fall far short, however, of adequately
differentiating between the two forms of D
& E, much less of achieving the degree of
certainty regarding the Act's scope that
Congress could have easily accomplished
had it followed Stenberg, . . . The three
differences between the Act and the
Nebraska statute that the government relies
on are as follows. First, the government
notes that unlike the Nebraska statute which
applied when the living fetus or a substantial
portion of it was delivered "into the vagina,"
the federal Act applies only when there is a
vaginal delivery "outside the body of the
mother." The government argues that
because non-intact D & E generally involves
dismemberment of the fetus before it leaves
the mother's body, the specification that the
Act applies only when a living fetus or a
part thereof is delivered outside the mother's
body makes clear that the Act does not apply
to that procedure. The government's claim is
incorrect. As the record demonstrates and
the district court found, in non-intact D &
Es, a doctor may extract a substantial
portion of the fetus-including either a part
of the fetal trunk past the navel or the entire
fetal head-to the point where it is outside the
body of the mother before the fetal
disarticulation occurs. . . . Second, the
Nebraska statute applied only when "a living
unborn child, or a substantial portion
thereof' is delivered for the purpose of
performing a prohibited act, whereas the
federal Act states its prohibition applies only
when either the "entire fetal head" or "any
part of the fetal trunk past the navel" of a
living fetus is delivered for a similar
purpose. The government argues that the use
of a "specific anatomic landmark" addresses
the concern the Supreme Court expressed
with the "substantial portion" language of
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the Nebraska statute. As with the first
difference relied upon by the government,
however, the "specific anatomic landmark"
language makes the Act different from the
Nebraska statute but does not exclude non-
intact D & Es from the Act's coverage. As
the district court found, intact D & Es are
not the only form of D & E in which the
"entire fetal head" or "any part of the fetal
trunk past the navel" of a living fetus may
be delivered prior to the performance of an
act banned by the statute: the "anatomic
landmark" specified in the Act may be
reached by doctors performing either intact
or non-intact D & Es. Accordingly, this
second difference from the Nebraska statute,
like the first, does not establish that the Act
is applicable only to intact D & Es.
Third, the Nebraska statute applied when a
doctor "deliberately and intentionally
deliver[s] into the vagina a living unborn
child, or a substantial portion thereof, for the
purpose of performing a procedure that the
person performing such procedure knows
will kill the unborn child and does kill the
unborn child." The federal statute, however,
requires that a doctor "deliberately and
intentionally vaginally deliver [ ] a living
fetus for the purpose of performing an overt
act that the person knows will kill the
partially delivered living fetus" and
"perform f 1 the overt act, other than
completion of delivery, that kills the
partially delivered living fetus." The
government argues that this "overt act"
requirement unambiguously establishes that
the Act does not apply to abortion
procedures other than intact D & Es.
However, this language is also not as
restrictive as the government claims. In non-
intact D & Es, as well as in the intact form
of the procedure, if the fetus has been
brought to either of the two anatomic
landmarks specified in the Act, a doctor may
then, in order to complete the abortion
safely, need to perform an "overt act," other
than completing delivery, that the physician
knows the fetus cannot survive, if it is still
living, and that "kills" the fetus. The "overt
act" that may be performed in a non-intact D
& E includes disarticulating the fetus or
compressing the abdomen or other fetal part
that is obstructing the completion of the
uterine evacuation. As with the other two
differences in the statutory language that the
government claims clearly establish that the
Act applies only to intact D & E, the "overt
act" language does not so restrict the Act's
applicability.
Contrary to the government's claim,
properly construed the Act covers non-intact
as well as intact D & Es. As a result, despite
containing some provisions that are different
in form from those in the Nebraska statute,
the Act is sufficiently broad to cause those
who perform non-intact D & E procedures
to "fear prosecution, conviction, and
imprisonment." The resulting chilling effect
on doctors' willingness to perform
previability post-first trimester abortions
would impose an undue burden on the
constitutional rights of women.
ii. The Act's Scienter Requirements Do Not
Cure the Constitutional Infirmity
The government also argues that the Act's
scienter requirements preclude application
of the statute to physicians who perform
non-intact D & E procedures and that the
federal statute should therefore survive
constitutional scrutiny. Although the Act
does limit its reach to those who "knowingly
perform a partial-birth abortion," and
"deliberately and intentionally vaginally
deliver[ ] a living fetus until, in the case of a
head-first presentation, the entire fetal head
is outside the body of the mother, or, in the
case of breech presentation, any part of the
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fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body
of the mother," these scienter requirements
do not permit us to interpret the Act as
reaching only the intact D & E procedure.
The government's argument about the
restrictive effect of the statute's scienter
requirements depends on the premise that,
once the scienter requirements are applied,
the Act's description of the prohibited
procedure includes only intact D & Es.
However, that is simply not the case. The
actions described in the statute's definition
of the prohibited procedure can be
performed with the requisite intent in both
the intact and the non-intact forms of the D
& E procedure. For instance, the record
shows that a doctor performing a non-intact
D & E of a fetus in the breech position may,
in order to minimize the number of
disarticulated fetal parts removed from the
woman's body, "deliberately and
intentionally vaginally deliver[ ] a living
fetus until the fetal trunk past the navel is
outside the body of the mother" before
performing the acts of disarticulation. Such
an abortion meets all of the requirements of
the procedure outlawed by the Act . .. Even
with the Act's scienter requirements,
therefore, non-intact D & Es readily fall
within the scope of the statute's description
of the banned procedure. As a result, the
inclusion of the scienter requirements does
not resolve the undue burden concerns
recognized by the Supreme Court in
Stenberg.
iii. Conclusion
The Act's definition of the prohibited
procedure, like that of the unconstitutional
Nebraska statute, covers both forms of D &
E, intact and non-intact. In any event, it fails
to differentiate between the two sufficiently
clearly to permit doctors to perform the
latter procedure without fear of prosecution.
Because the Act applies to, or could readily
be employed to prosecute, physicians who
"use [non-intact] D & E procedures, the
most commonly used method for performing
previability second trimester abortions," it
imposes a substantial risk of criminal
liability on almost all doctors who perform
previability abortions after the first
trimester. Thus, the Act would, at a
minimum, create a chilling effect that
"'plac[es] a substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus."' We conclude that,
because of both the actual and the potential
risk to doctors who perform previability
abortions, the Act imposes an "undue
burden upon a woman's right to make an
abortion decision" and is unconstitutional.
C. The Act is Unconstitutionally Vague
Besides lacking the required health
exception and imposing an undue burden on
a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy,
the Act is also unconstitutionally vague. It
fails to define clearly the medical procedures
it prohibits, depriving doctors of fair notice
and encouraging arbitrary enforcement. The
Act's scienter requirements do not cure the
statute's vagueness. We conclude that the
Act's unconstitutional vagueness constitutes
an independent ground for affirming the
district court's finding of unconstitutionality.
To survive vagueness review, a statute must
"(1) define the offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited; and
(2) establish standards to permit police to
enforce the law in a non-arbitrary, non-
discriminatory manner." The need to avoid
vagueness is particularly acute when the
statute imposes criminal penalties, or when
it implicates constitutionally protected
rights. Because this statute both imposes
criminal penalties and implicates a
constitutionally protected right, it is subject
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to heightened vagueness review. The Act
cannot survive that review. The government
essentially makes three arguments regarding
the vagueness of the Act. First, it asserts that
the statutory scheme as a whole "specifically
and narrowly defines" the single "method of
abortion" that it outlaws (i.e., intact D & E).
As we have explained, Stenberg explicitly
described, for the benefit of legislative
bodies (and, presumably, the government),
two possible ways to make clear that a
prohibition on intact D & E is applicable
only to that form of the procedure. Congress
deliberately declined to adopt either method
and instead drafted statutory language that
may best be understood as also outlawing
non-intact D & Es, the type of procedure
most often used to perform post-first
trimester previability abortions. This reading
of the statute was confirmed by the trial
testimony of numerous doctors and
practitioners offering abortion services. As
the district court noted, "they do not
understand exactly what the Act prohibits."
Although we may conclude following a
painstaking legal analysis that the statute
covers both forms of D & E, the language of
the statute, taken as a whole, is not
sufficiently clear regarding what it permits
and prohibits to guide the conduct of those
affected by it terms, specifically medical
practitioners. As a result, the Act is
unconstitutionally vague, and certainly so if
the legislative intent was, as the government
argues, to restrict its scope to intact D & E.
Second, the government objects to the
district court's conclusion that the specific
terms "partial-birth abortion, "overt act,"
and "living fetus" are "fatally ambiguous."
As to the term "partial-birth abortion," the
government challenges the district court's
statement that the term has "little if any
medical significance," arguing that it is "
'widely known' as synonymous with the
medical terms 'D & X' and 'intact D & E."'
The only citation the government offers to
support this argument is a Sixth Circuit case
which considered an Ohio ban on "partial-
birth abortion." Taft, however, does nothing
to bolster the government's argument that
the term "partial-birth abortion" is, in and of
itself, sufficiently clear as to the procedures
it encompasses that any vagueness problems
with the statute are cured. In fact, the
contrast between the Ohio statute reviewed
in Taft and the federal Act at issue here
illuminates the latter's vagueness. In Taft,
the Sixth Circuit's conclusion that the Ohio
statute survived vagueness review did not
rest at all on the proposition that the term
"partial-birth abortion" is "'widely known'
as synonymous with the medical terms 'D &
X' and 'intact D & E."' Rather, the Sixth
Circuit held the Ohio law was not
unconstitutionally vague because the statute
defined the restricted procedures using
"clinical terms" and explicitly stated that it
did not apply to non-intact D & E or other
abortion procedures besides intact D & E...
By contrast, Congress chose to ignore
Stenberg's warning when it enacted the Act,
as noted in the previous section, and failed
to follow its clear roadmap-either by
defining the scope of the statute's
prohibition using clinical terms that track the
medical differences between intact D & E
and other forms of D & E or by delineating
expressly which procedures are exempted
from the ban. ...
Alternatively, the government argues that
"partial-birth abortion" is an "expressly
defined term [in the statute] -and thus cannot
itself support a vagueness challenge."
However, the mere fact that "partial-birth
abortion" is an "expressly defined term" in
the statute is not enough to survive
vagueness review if that definition is itself
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vague, as is the case here. Although the
federal Act uses somewhat different
language from that used in the statute
invalidated in Stenberg, its definition of
"partial-birth abortion" nonetheless "fails to
provide a reasonable opportunity to know
what conduct is prohibited" and "is so
indefinite as to allow arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement." . . . As a
result, doctors who perform non-intact D &
E abortions, which the government contends
are not intended to be outlawed by the Act,
have good reason to fear that they will be
deemed subject to its prohibitions. At the
least, they cannot be reasonably certain that
their conduct is beyond the reach of the
Act's criminal provisions; nor can they be
reasonably assured that the Act will not be
arbitrarily enforced. The government also
objects to the district court's characterization
of "overt act" as vague. It asserts that the
term itself is not unconstitutionally vague,
citing its use in the Constitution and various
federal statutes. It further claims that by
modifying "overt act" with the phrase "other
than completion of delivery," the statute
makes clear that the term does not apply to
"cutting the umbilical cord" or other
"essential aspects of delivery," which, it
argues, establishes that the statute's ban does
not encompass induction. While the
government rightly points out that the term
"overt act" is not in all usages
unconstitutionally vague, the district court
was correct to hold that in the context of the
Act it is, even when modified by "other than
completion of delivery." Beyond conclusory
statements, the government in no way
refutes the district court's determination that
"overt act, other than completion of
delivery" can plausibly encompass a range
of acts involved in non-intact D & E,
including disarticulation and compressing or
decompressing the skull or abdomen or
other fetal part that is obstructing
completion of the uterine evacuation (and in
induction, possibly even the cutting of the
umbilical cord). Because these acts can
readily be deemed covered by the phrase
"overt act, other than completion of
delivery," the phrase does not provide the
definitiveness about the statute's scope that
the government asserts. The use of the term
"overt act" does nothing to remedy the
statute's failure to provide adequate notice of
what forms of D & E the Act prohibits and
to prevent its arbitrary enforcement. The
government additionally challenges the
district court's conclusion that the term
"living fetus" contributes to the vagueness
of the statute. We, like the Third Circuit,
conclude that the use of "living fetus" in a
statute banning "partial-birth abortions"
adds to confusion about the scope of the
prohibited conduct. Although the term
"living fetus" may suggest to some that the
Act's prohibition is limited to abortions of
viable fetuses, the term has no such
meaning. While a fetus typically is not
viable until at least 24 weeks Imp, it can be
"living"-meaning that it has a detectable
heartbeat or pulsating umbilical cord-as
early as seven weeks Imp, well before the
end of even the first trimester. As the Third
Circuit noted, "because a fetus may be
'living' as early as seven weeks Imp, use of
the term 'living' instead of 'viable' indicates
that, contrary to the understanding of a large
segment of the public and the concomitant
rhetoric, the Act is in no way limited to late-
term, or even mid-term, abortions.- [M]ost
common abortion procedures will fall within
this limitation." Therefore, far from curing
the statute's vagueness problems, the use of
the term "living fetus" instead of "viable
fetus" creates additional confusion about the
Act's scope. Third, the government argues
that any unconstitutional vagueness is
eliminated by the "narrowing and mutually
reinforcing scienter requirements."
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However, as we explained in the undue
burden section, section III.B supra, the
scienter requirements do not restrict the
statute's reach to doctors who purposely set
out to perform the intact form of the D & E
procedure. They therefore do not remedy the
Act's failure to provide fair warning of the
prohibited conduct; rather, they permit the
Act's arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement. In short, as we recently held, a
scienter requirement applied to an element
that is itself vague does not cure the
provision's overall vagueness. The scienter
requirements, therefore, do nothing to cure
the Act's vagueness. Because neither the
statute when read as a whole nor its
individual components provide fair warning
of the prohibited conduct to those it
regulates and because the Act permits
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,
we affirm the district court's determination
that the Act is unconstitutionally vague.
IV. Remedy
In considering the remedy for a statute
found to restrict access to abortion in
violation of the Constitution, we are guided
by "[t]hree interrelated principles." First, we
endeavor to invalidate no more of a statute
than necessary. Second, "mindful that our
constitutional mandate and institutional
competence are limited, we restrain
ourselves from 'rewrit[ing] state law to
conform it to constitutional requirements'
even as we strive to salvage it." Third, in
devising the remedy we must be cognizant
of legislative intent "for a court cannot 'use
its remedial powers to circumvent the intent
of the legislature."' Applying these
principles to the present case, we conclude
that upholding the permanent injunction
against the enforcement of the statute in its
entirety is the only permissible remedy. We
cannot, consistent with the judiciary's
limited role, devise a narrower injunction
that adequately addresses the various
constitutional infirmities in the Act.
Our conclusion is dictated in part by the
grounds on which we hold the Act
unconstitutional. We do not conclude that it
is unconstitutional solely due to its lack of a
health exception. Had our holding on the
statute's constitutionality rested solely on
that ground, we might have been able to
draft a more "finely drawn" injunction
prohibiting the Act's enforcement only when
the banned procedure was necessary to
preserve a woman's health. Because such
relief would not require us to rewrite
substantial portions of the statute, drafting
the injunction would be within our
institutional competence. Nonetheless, in the
case of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act,
the issuance of such an order would not be
consistent with the Ayotte precepts, because
in order to do so we would be required to
violate the intent of the legislature and usurp
the policy-making authority of Congress.
Congress did not inadvertently omit a health
exception from the Act. It was not only fully
aware of Stenberg's holding that a statute
regulating "partial-birth abortion" requires a
health exception, but it adopted the Act in a
deliberate effort to persuade the Court to
reverse that part of its decision. Congress
was advised repeatedly that if it passed an
abortion ban without a health exception, the
statute would be declared unconstitutional,
yet it rejected a number of amendments that
would have added such an exception. It
considered the omission of the exception to
be a critical component of the legislation it
was enacting. Both of the Act's main
sponsors, as well as various co-sponsors,
asserted that the purpose of the Act would
be wholly undermined if it contained a
health exception and that, if an exception
were included, the statute would be of little
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force or effect. Enacting a "partial-birth
abortion" ban with no health exception was
clearly one of Congress's primary
motivations in passing the Act.
In light of this legislative history, it would
be improper for us to issue an injunction that
essentially adds a health exception to the
statute-an exception that Congress
purposefully excluded from the Act. When
Congress deliberately makes a decision to
omit a particular provision from a statute-a
decision that it is aware may well result in
the statute's wholesale invalidation-and
when it defeats multiple amendments that
would have added that provision to the
statute, we would not be faithful to its
legislative intent were we to devise a
remedy that in effect inserts the provision
into the statute contrary to its wishes. Such
an action would be inconsistent with our
proper judicial role.
Our inquiry as to whether the legislature
would have "preferred what is left of its
statute to no statute at all" does not change
our conclusion. Given the record before us,
it is impossible to say that Congress would
have preferred the Act with a health
exception engrafted upon it to no statute at
all. The creation of legislation is a
fundamental part of the political process, to
be performed by the elected branches only.
In deciding whether to adopt legislation on
highly controversial issues, elected officials
must weigh various factors and make
informed political judgments. When, in such
cases, it is not possible to achieve the full
legislative goal, the leaders of the battle may
prefer to drop the legislation entirely in
order to be able to wage a more dramatic
and emotional campaign in the public arena.
They may conclude that leaving an issue
completely unaddressed will make it easier
for them to achieve their ultimate goals than
would a partial resolution that leaves their
"base" discontented and disillusioned.
Dropping the proposed legislation (or even
having it defeated) may be the best way to
gain adherents to the cause, inspire the
faithful, raise funds, and possibly even
generate support for a constitutional
amendment. Conversely, the sponsors of a
bill may consider a partial victory worthless
from a political standpoint, as the sponsors
of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act told
their fellow members of Congress here, or
they may just object strongly to such a
solution from a moral or even a religious
standpoint. Particularly when an issue
involving moral or religious values is at
stake, it is far from true that the legislative
body would always prefer some of a statute
to none at all.
Abortion is an issue that causes partisans on
both sides to invoke strongly held
fundamental principles and beliefs. We are
prepared to deal with the constitutional
issues relating to that subject, but not with
the question how either side would exercise
its moral and other judgments with respect
to tactical political decisions. Whether the
congressional partisans who supported the
Act would have preferred to have what they
repeatedly and unequivocally deemed to be
ineffective legislation or to do without the
statute and preserve the status quo ante as a
political and moral tool is a determination
we are simply unable and unwilling to make.
In any event, we need not rest our decision
as to the appropriate remedy solely on the
omission of a health exception because we
have determined that the Act is
unconstitutional on other grounds as well-
on the grounds that it imposes an undue
burden on women seeking abortions and that
it is impermissibly vague. Along with the
omission of the health exception, the nature
of these constitutional errors precludes us
from devising a remedy any narrower than
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the invalidation of the entire statute, for a
number of reasons. First, in order to cure the
constitutional infirmities, we would in effect
have to strike the principal substantive
provision that is now in the Act and then,
akin to writing legislation, adopt new terms
with new definitions and new language
creating limitations on the Act's scope.
Second, creating relief that would limit the
Act sufficiently to enable it to pass
constitutional muster would require us to
make decisions that are the prerogative of
elected officials and thus would be
inconsistent with the proper distribution of
responsibilities between the legislative and
judicial branches. Third, the magnitude of
the change in the Act's coverage that would
be necessary to make the Act even
potentially constitutional would result in a
statute that would be fundamentally
different from the one enacted. Fourth,
devising narrowing relief of this type would
be unfaithful to Congress's intent in passing
the Act.
Our conclusions regarding the undue burden
imposed by the Act and the Act's
impermissible vagueness were based on our
determination that the Act's definition of
"partial-birth abortion" covers both forms of
the D & E procedure; at the very least, we
said, the statute does not adequately
distinguish between those forms.
Significantly, the two forms of D & E
constitute the means by which the vast
majority of post-first trimester previability
abortions are conducted. Remedying the
problem of the Act's scope is not a simple
matter of striking a portion of the statutory
language, however, or of drafting an
injunction that performs that function. Nor is
the existing statutory language susceptible to
a simple limiting construction. In order to
remedy the constitutional problems with the
Act's definition of "partial-birth abortion,"
we would essentially have to "rewrite [the
statutory language] to conform it
constitutional requirements," a task





Furthermore, before we could even begin
the task of rewriting the statute so as to
arrive at an adequate injunctive order, we
would first have to decide which of the
different methods of performing post-first
trimester previability abortions should be
prohibited by the revised Act. We are not
willing to make such choices for four
reasons. First, doctors disagree about the
medical necessity and effects of each of the
methods. The decision regarding which of
these methods to regulate is a policy choice
that only Congress can make. Second,
choosing which methods to regulate would
require us to draw lines between different
abortion procedures with which we are not
"intimately familiar," another factor
cautioning against our attempting to create a
narrow remedy. Third, determining whether
to cover particular forms or procedures
would raise unresolved constitutional
questions that we need not otherwise decide
on this appeal. For example, neither this
court nor the Supreme Court has previously
decided whether a statute that bans only
intact D & E would be constitutional.
Fourth, even if Congress would have
preferred an injunction that made the
controversial policy choices we would be
required to make and even if Congress
would have preferred the substantial
alteration of the statute to its total
invalidation, it is contrary to the appropriate
allocation of legislative and judicial
functions for Congress to have "covered the
waterfront" and left the job of selecting the
conduct that could properly be prohibited to
us. As Ayotte reiterated, Congress may not
"'set a net large enough to catch all possible
offenders, and leave it to the courts to step
inside' to announce to whom the statute may
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be applied." Here, Congress,
notwithstanding existing Supreme Court law
and the multiple opportunities it was given
to limit the Act's scope, passed an overly
broad ban that it was aware likely violated
the Constitution as construed by the Court.
In so doing, Congress left it to the judiciary
to sort out which parts of the statute are
constitutional and which are not. This is
precisely what Ayotte reminded us Congress
may not do. Narrowing the statute is
"quintessentially legislative work" that, if
undertaken by us, would exceed "our
constitutional mandate and institutional
competence."
Even if we could, consistent with the
judiciary's proper role, choose which
procedures to prohibit, the only options that
stand a chance of passing constitutional
muster would leave us with an Act of a
drastically more limited scope than the
current one. Because the Supreme Court has
held that a statutory prohibition that covers
both intact and non-intact D & Es is
unconstitutional the only possibly
constitutional regulation would be a
prohibition limited to the intact D & E
procedure (and possibly induction). Even
assuming that such a regulation would be
constitutional), an injunction that so limited
the statute would outlaw only a very small
portion of the procedures prohibited under
the existing Act. Such an injunction would
radically change the nature of the statute and
result in a regulatory scheme substantially
different from the one passed by Congress.
When a "narrow" remedy would
substantially change the very nature of a
statute, adopting that remedy exceeds the
proper judicial role.
Finally, we believe that devising a narrow
remedy would not be "faithful to legislative
intent." Congress did not unintentionally
draft the broad definition of "partial-birth
abortion" that gives rise to the undue burden
and vagueness concerns, nor did it write the
unconstitutionally overbroad language
without the benefit of judicial guidance.
Instead, Congress chose not to follow the
roadmap the Court provided in Stenberg. It
repeatedly dismissed warnings that the Act's
overly inclusive scope made it vulnerable to
constitutional challenge. Even if we could
draft a remedy that sufficiently restricted the
scope of the statute (which we believe we
could not properly do consistent with our
limited judicial role), such a narrowing
construction would serve not to cure an error
but to reverse a political judgment that
Congress expressly made. Nor can we say
that Congress would have preferred any
such narrowing construction to no statute at
all. For reasons discussed above, we are not
capable of making the judgment that, in the
eyes of Congress, legislation restricted to
non-intact D & Es would have been
preferable to no legislation at all. We believe
that a narrow remedy designed to address
the undue burden and vagueness concerns,
as well as the health exception, would likely
violate Congress's intent in passing the Act.
We are reluctant to invalidate an entire
statute. However, after considering all of the
obstacles to our devising a narrower remedy,
we conclude that such is our obligation.
Accordingly, we uphold the district court's
order permanently enjoining enforcement of
the Act in its entirety.
V. Conclusion
The Act lacks the health exception required
of all abortion regulations in the absence of
a medical consensus that the prohibited
procedure is never necessary to preserve
women's health, imposes an undue burden
on a woman's right to choose a previability
abortion, and is impermissibly vague. For
each of these reasons, independently, we
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hold that the Act is unconstitutional. We
also hold that, in light of all the
circumstances, the appropriate remedy for
the serious constitutional flaws in the Act is
that which the district court elected: to
enjoin the enforcement of the statute in its
entirety. The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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The Supreme Court on Tuesday accepted the
Bush administration's request to review a
2003 federal ban on a procedure known by
its critics as "partial birth" abortion, setting
up a major test of abortion rights at the
newly changed high court.
The administration is appealing a lower-
court ruling that struck down the law
because it lacked an exception if a physician
believes the procedure is necessary to
preserve the woman's health. The ban on the
method, which involves partially delivering
the fetus before collapsing the skull, has
never been enforced because of the
litigation.
The justices will hear arguments in the fall.
The last time the justices took up a case
involving this procedure was in 2000. The
court by one vote invalidated a state
prohibition because it lacked a health
exception for the mother. The swing vote in
that case was Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,
who recently retired.
Justice Samuel Alito, who succeeded
O'Connor on Jan. 31, and Chief Justice John
Roberts, who replaced William Rehnquist
on Sept. 29, had in the past expressed
support for greater government latitude to
regulate abortion.
Because of the new justices
controversy over the right to
established by the high court





whether the court would take up the federal
ban.
"We fear the new court is ready to further
undermine a woman's access to legal
abortion," said Jennifer Brown of Legal
Momentum, an abortion rights group.
"We are hopeful that the court will reverse
course and repudiate its 2000 decision," said
Denise Burke of Americans United for Life,
which opposes abortion rights.
The case arises as state legislatures step up
efforts to regulate abortion and emphasize
the rights of a fetus over a woman's right to
an abortion.
At issue in the current dispute, begun by a
Nebraska physician, is a July ruling by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit
saying it had to follow the high court's 2000
decision.
"In the absence of new evidence ... we are
bound by the Supreme Court's conclusion
that 'substantial medical authority' supports .
. . a health exception," the appeals court
said. Two other lower courts ruled against
the federal ban last month.
But Congress, in passing the 2003 law,
asserted that the procedure is "never"
necessary to preserve a woman's health, U.S.
Solicitor General Paul Clement noted in his
appeal.
Lawyers at the Center for Reproductive
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Rights, representing LeRoy Carhart and
other physicians challenging the federal ban,
noted the 8th Circuit said Congress lacked
medical grounds for its findings.
Nancy Northup, president of the center, said
she believes the justices will require a health
exception: "We think the court will show
proper respect for its precedent."
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"Justices to Expand Review of 'Partial-Birth' Abortion Ban"
The New York Times
June 20, 2006
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court, acting on Monday over
the Bush administration's objection,
expanded its review of the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act to include additional
challenges to the constitutionality of the
2003 federal law.
The justices had already agreed in February
to take up the issue in their next term. They
were expected to hear that case, an appeal
by the administration of a 2005 ruling by the
federal appeals court in St. Louis, which
declared the law unconstitutional, shortly
after the term opens in October.
That argument is now likely to be postponed
until November or December, making the
issue less visible than it would otherwise
have been during the weeks leading up to
the 2006 Congressional elections.
The new case is also a Bush administration
appeal, but one on which the administration
had urged the justices to postpone action
until after they ruled in the St. Louis case,
Gonzales v. Carhart, No. 05-380.
Administration lawyers told the court that
the new case, Gonzales v. Planned
Parenthood, No. 05-1382, duplicated the
other in significant respects, and that there
was no reason to "delay the ultimate
resolution of the extraordinarily important
question of the act's constitutionality."
However, Planned Parenthood Federation of
America, which brought the successful
challenge to the law in the federal appeals
court in San Francisco, urged the justices to
add the new case because the appeals court
decision had swept more broadly and
provided "the most complete available
record" on the likely impact of the statute.
The law, which has never taken effect
because of legal challenges, makes it a crime
for doctors to perform abortions by a
method that abortion opponents have labeled
partial birth. In its opinion on Jan. 31
invalidating the statute, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit said
the method was described so vaguely that
the law could criminalize abortions
commonly performed in the second
trimester of pregnancy, well before a fetus is
viable, thus violating the right to due
process.
In the St. Louis case, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had not
addressed this issue, instead limiting its
decision to the question of the law's failure
to include an exception to protect a pregnant
woman's health. Abortion rights advocates
have generally viewed the Ninth Circuit's
opinion as the more complete and
persuasive.
Eve C. Gartner, a lawyer for Planned
Parenthood, said in an interview that she
was pleased by the court's action. It shows,
she said, that "they're open to hearing our
arguments."
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Bush administration lawyers asked the
Supreme Court on Monday to reinstate the
first federal law banning a late-term abortion
procedure, arguing that it should be
outlawed because it is gruesome and is
"never medically indicated" as a safer
surgical procedure.
The government's appeal asks the high court
to overturn the decision of a U.S. appeals
court in St. Louis, which struck down the
law as unconstitutional.
It came on the same day the Senate took up
the nomination of Judge John G. Roberts Jr.
for chief justice of the United States. If, as
expected, Roberts is confirmed this week,
his court could put new limits on abortion
during its first term, which begins Monday.
The dispute over this type of procedure-
known medically as intact dilation and
extraction and called "partial-birth abortion"
by critics-amounts to a rerun of a case
heard five years ago by the high court.
However, the outcome is in doubt this time
because the makeup of the court is changing.
In 2000, the justices ruled 5 to 4 to strike
down a Nebraska law that made it a crime
for a doctor to remove much of a fetus intact
during a midterm abortion. This procedure is
used by some doctors who perform
abortions in the fifth or sixth month of a
pregnancy.
In the past, the Supreme Court had said that
women could choose to end their
pregnancies until the time a fetus could live
on its own, which occurs after the sixth
month. These later-term abortions are more
complicated and only a few doctors perform
them.
In Nebraska, for example, Dr. Leroy Carhart
was the only physician who performed
midterm abortions, and in 1997 he filed a
legal challenge to a state law banning intact
dilation and extraction procedures,
contending the law was unconstitutional. He
testified that the intact removals were safer
than other methods because there was less
chance of bleeding and infection.
Other medical experts backed up his
testimony, agreeing that, in some instances,
the procedure was a better method of
performing abortions.
A federal judge in Nebraska, the U.S. Court
of Appeals in St. Louis and ultimately the
Supreme Court invalidated the state's law in
2000. The Supreme Court opinion said that
"substantial medical authority supports" the
doctor's claim that banning this procedure
"could endanger women's health."
Nonetheless, Congress passed the Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act in 2003 and made it
a federal crime to perform such procedures.
Lawmakers pointedly disagreed with the
doctors who supported the use of the
procedure. The legislators concluded that
"there is no credible medical evidence that
partial-birth abortions are safe or safer than
other abortion procedures" and that they are
"never medically indicated to preserve the
health of the mother."
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When Carhart sued again, this time
challenging the new federal law, he won this
year in both the U.S. District Court in
Omaha and the U.S. 8th Circuit Court of
Appeals in St. Louis. Those judges blocked
the federal law from taking effect, and said
again that the medical testimony indicated
the procedure was sometimes needed to
ensure a woman's health.
In their appeal to the Supreme Court, the
Bush administration lawyers said the lower
courts should have deferred to the
lawmakers in Washington, not the medical
experts who testified in the case.
"Congress' findings concerning the medical
necessity of partial-birth abortion were
entitled to substantial deference," U.S.
Solicitor General Paul D. Clement told the
court in Gonzales v. Carhart.
The eight associate justices met behind
closed doors Monday to go over more than
1,700 appeals that have been awaiting action
since June. They are expected to announce
as early as this morning that several will be
heard by the full court in the months ahead.
However, it will be several months before
the justices decide whether to hear the
abortion case. By then, President Bush's
replacement for Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor is likely to be on the court and in
position to decide the case. O'Connor
announced in July that she planned to retire.
Five years ago, O'Connor cast the decisive
vote to strike down the Nebraska law, saying
the government may not regulate abortion in
a way that endangers the health of women.
Though she said she planned to participate
in the court's work as the term begins, she
will step down when her replacement is
confirmed.
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Two federal appeals courts on opposite
coasts Tuesday declared Congress' ban on a
controversial late-term abortion procedure
unconstitutional-making it a virtual
certainty that newly confirmed Justice
Samuel A. Alito will have the opportunity to
rule on the issue in the future.
Both the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
in San Francisco and the 2nd Circuit Court
of Appeals in New York said the law was
flawed because it failed to provide an
exception when the health of a woman was
at stake.
The two rulings came on the same day that
the Senate, as expected, confirmed Alito,
and underscored how quickly Alito's
replacement of retired Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor could transform abortion law.
In 2000, O'Connor cast the deciding vote to
strike down a Nebraska law barring late-
term abortion procedures because of the lack
of the women's health exception.
The ban found unconstitutional Tuesday was
passed in 2003. It states that the procedure,
which its critics term "partial-birth"
abortion, is "never necessary to preserve the
health of a woman." The statute also would
subject any physician who "knowingly
performs a partial-birth abortion" to civil
and criminal penalties, including up to two
years in prison.
Advocates on both sides of the debate said
they believed there were now five votes on
the Supreme Court to uphold a ban on the
procedure: Chief Justice John G. Roberts
and Associate Justices Antonin Scalia,
Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas and
Alito.
"This is a different court now," said an
ebullient Jay Sekulow, lead attorney for the
conservative American Center for Law and
Justice in Washington, who filed friend-of-
the-court briefs supporting the law in both
cases decided Tuesday.
"This is the issue that is in the forefront of
the abortion debate now," Sekulow said.
Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.), who
argued against adoption of the ban in
Congress, said the newly configured court
should be bound by the landmark ruling that
first guaranteed women the constitutional
right to an abortion in 1973.
"Roe v. Wade made it clear that a woman's
life and health must be protected. Those
pushing for a ban on what they call "partial-
birth" abortion failed to succinctly define the
medical procedure they seek to ban and they
have refused to protect the woman's health,"
Feinstein said.
"It is my hope" that Justice Alito, whose
confirmation Feinstein opposed, "follows
the path of his predecessor, Justice
O'Connor, by supporting" Roe and a ruling
interpreting it in 1992, "rather than putting
his personal views above the law.
Unfortunately, I fear he may not."
The unanimous ruling from the 9th Circuit
went further than the one from the 2nd
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Circuit, striking the law on the grounds that
it placed an "undue burden" on a woman's
right to an abortion and was
unconstitutionally vague.
The 9th Circuit also upheld a lower court
finding that the act "created a risk of
criminal liability for virtually all abortions
performed after the first trimester, which the
district court found, placed a substantial
obstacle in the path of abortion-seekers."
Although the 2nd Circuit also toppled the
federal law, the circuit's Chief Judge John
M. Walker made it clear that he took no
pleasure in doing so. He said the court was
"compelled by a precedent to invalidate a
statute that bans a morally repugnant
practice."
The 8th Circuit in St. Louis last July became
the first court to find the ban constitutionally
flawed. The Justice Department already has
asked for a Supreme Court review of the 8th
Circuit ruling, a request the justices could
consider at their next conference Feb. 17.
But since the court has its last round of oral
arguments for this term scheduled for April,
it is possible that the court's consideration of
the issue could be put off until the October
term.
About 90% of the 1.3 million abortions
performed in the U.S. annually take place in
the first trimester of pregnancy. The federal
statute banning the late-term abortion
procedure would not affect those abortions.
The law struck down Tuesday focuses on
second-trimester abortions that are
performed for a variety of reasons, including
the mother's health and fetal anomalies
discovered by modem medical procedures
such as amniocentesis.
At issue in the case is a procedure that most
doctors refer to as intact dilation and
extraction, which involves partially
removing a fetus from the uterus and
puncturing or crushing the skull.
Justice Department lawyers, who have
defended the statute, have argued that the
procedure causes fetal pain, blurs the line
between abortion and infanticide and is not
medically necessary.
Advocates of abortion rights, as well as
many doctors and organizations such as the
California Medical Assn., contend that the
procedure in some instances is medically
necessary.
The 9th Circuit decision cited those opinions
in its 3-0 ruling Tuesday, written by Judge
Stephen Reinhardt, an appointee of Jimmy
Carter. He was joined by judges William A.
Fletcher and Sidney R. Thomas, both
Clinton appointees.
The federal law was challenged by the
Planned Parenthood Federation of America,
Planned Parenthood Golden Gate and the
city and county of San Francisco. The
plaintiffs asserted that the law was so
vaguely worded that it would effectively
prohibit all forms of dilation and extraction.
The 9th Circuit agreed.
Reinhardt also emphasized that the record
did not support contentions that a medical
consensus exists that the procedure is never
necessary to preserve a woman's health.
The 9th Circuit upheld a permanent
injunction against the law, issued by U.S.
District Judge Phyllis Hamilton in San
Francisco in 2004.
"We're very happy that the 9th Circuit
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recognized that the statute suffers from
significant constitutional flaws and would
endanger the health and safety of women if
enforced," said Eve C. Gartner, a lawyer for
the Planned Parenthood Federation of
America, who argued the case.
But she said her joy was tempered by what
she thinks Alito's ascendancy to the high
court portends.
Alito was on an appellate panel that
unanimously overturned a New Jersey ban
on the late-term procedure, but Gartner said
Tuesday that "as a 3rd Circuit judge, he was
obliged to follow the law as the Supreme
Court laid it out . . . Now, as a Supreme
Court justice, it is highly unclear whether he
will consider himself bound by that
precedent."
Erwin Chemerinsky, a liberal Duke
University law professor, praised the 9th
Circuit ruling as "very thorough," but agreed
that it could be nullified because of the
changed composition of the Supreme Court.
Douglas Kmiec, a conservative
constitutional law professor at Pepperdine
Law School in Malibu, said he, too, thought
the newly configured Supreme Court would
reinstate the ban.
"The fact that some abortion doctors want to
keep up a gruesome practice does not make
it medically necessary under the substantial
evidence standard," Kmiec said.
Added Kmiec: "I count to five [votes] today
for reversal."
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"8th U.S. Circuit Finds Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Unconstitutional"
St. Louis Daily Record
Jul 15, 2005
Donna Walter
The federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act
of 2003 is unconstitutional because it lacks
an exception to preserve the health of the
mother, the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals said Friday.
The case is almost identical to Stenberg v.
Carhart, which dealt with a Nebraska ban
on partial-birth abortion. In this 2000
decision, the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down the state law as unconstitutional
because it lacked a health exception and
because it placed an undue burden on a
woman's right to have an abortion. Before
Stenberg went up the Supreme Court, an 8th
Circuit panel-consisting of Judge Richard
S. Arnold, Judge Roger L. Wollman and
District Judge Paul A. Magnuson from
Minnesota--declared the state law invalid
based on the undue burden.
In the case at hand, Carhart v. Gonzales, the
8th Circuit did not address the undue burden
issue because it found the law
unconstitutional on the health exception
issue.
Both cases arose when Dr. LeRoy Carhart,
who has a family medical practice and
abortion facility in Bellevue, Neb., sought
injunctions against each law's enforcement.
Judge Richard G. Kopf, now chief judge of
the U.S. District Court in Nebraska, declared
each law unconstitutional.
The 8th Circuit's decision upholding Kopfs
judgment was made by an entirely new
panel of judges: Chief Judge James B.
Loken, Senior Circuit Judge George G. Fagg
and Circuit Judge Kermit E. Bye.
In an apparent effort to ensure the
constitutionality of the federal ban, Congress
made a number of findings and declarations
in the act itself. Among those were: (1)
under well-settled Supreme Court
jurisprudence, the United States Congress is
not bound to accept the same factual
findings that the Supreme Court was bound
to accept in Stenberg, (2) a moral, medical,
and ethical consensus exists that the practice
of performing a partial-birth abortion . . . is a
gruesome and inhumane procedure that is
never medically necessary and should be
prohibited, and (3) partial-birth abortions
pose serious risks to the health of the mother
undergoing the procedure.
The district judge declared Congress' finding
about a medical consensus was
unreasonable. On appeal, the government
argued congressional fact-finding must be
given deference under Turner Broadcasting
v. FCC, remanded by the Supreme Court in
1994 and finally decided in 1997. According
to the government's argument, the
substantial medical authority standard
cannot be used to disregard Congress'
findings.
The 8th Circuit, however, said the
government's deference argument is
irrelevant. The court based this conclusion
on a number of First Amendment cases,
which the Supreme Court in Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of the United States Inc.
said require independent appellate review.
Similarly, Carhart warrants independent
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appellate review, said the court, because it
concerns the possible denial of a
constitutional right.
The appellate court framed the question
before it as whether 'substantial medical
authority' supports the medical necessity of
the banned procedure and concluded that
when 'substantial medical authority' supports
the medical necessity of a procedure in some
instances, a health exception is
constitutionally required.
In the specific context of a ban on partial-
birth abortions, we join the reasoning of the
Fourth Circuit and some of the district courts
that have treated Stenberg as a per se
constitutional rule, wrote Bye. In Stenberg,
the Court surveyed all of the available
medical evidence (including the formal
district court record, the district court
records from other partial-birth abortion
cases, amicus submissions, and some
congressional records) and determined that
'substantial medical authority' supported the
need for a health exception.
Neither we, nor Congress, are free to
disagree with the Supreme Court's
determination because the Court's
conclusions are final on matters of
constitutional law, he wrote, citing United
States v. Dickerson, a 2000 Supreme Court
decision.
The government argued the Supreme Court
was wrong in Stenberg, but the 8th Circuit
pointed out the government presented no
evidence of a new medical consensus or
medical studies to show a change in
circumstances. In fact, said the court, one of
the government's own witnesses testified
there is no medical consensus and that one
of the physician groups take the position that
partial-birth abortion is sometimes medically
necessary.
Because there is no consensus on the issue
of medical necessity that would distinguish
Carhart from Stenberg, the 8th Circuit said
it was bound by Stenberg to hold that a
substantial medical authority supports the
medical necessity of a health exception to
the ban on partial-birth abortion.
This is not to say, however, that because the
Supreme Court concluded 'substantial
medical authority' supported the need for a
health exception in 2000, legislatures are
forever constitutionally barred from enacting
partial-birth abortion bans, Bye wrote.
Rather, the 'substantial medical authority'
test allows for the possibility that the
evidentiary support underlying the need for
a health exception might be reevaluated
under appropriate circumstances. Medical
technology and knowledge is constantly
advancing, and it remains theoretically
possible that at some point (either through
an advance in knowledge or the
development of new techniques, for
example), the procedures prohibited by the
Act will be rendered obsolete. Should that
day ever come, legislatures might then be
able to rely on this new evidence to prohibit
partial-birth abortions without providing a
health exception.
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"Abortion on the Horizon"
The Daily Standard
March 14, 2006
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross & Adam White
The season of abortion litigation is in full
bloom. South Dakota's passage of a bill
banning all abortions has captured most of
the headlines, and Mississippi is considering
similar legislation. Meanwhile, the Supreme
Court has quietly decided two abortion cases
this term-the first dealing with the process
of invalidating abortion statutes that are
unconstitutional in the case of medical
emergencies; the second involving whether
abortion protesters have violated the RICO
Act. More significant, the Court granted
certiorari last month in what may be the
most momentous abortion case in more than
a decade: Gonzales v. Carhart. Gonzales
involves a constitutional challenge to the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003,
which outlaws partial-birth abortions
throughout the country. While Roe v. Wade
will survive Gonzales, the issues involved
are significant, such that this case may be a
harbinger of things to come in the battle
over abortion.
To understand Gonzales v. Carhart, one
must begin with the Court's last highly-
publicized abortion case, Stenberg v.
Carhart. (Yes, the Carhart in both cases is
the same person: Nebraska-based abortion
doctor Leroy Carhart.) In that 2000 case, the
Supreme Court held 5-4 that a Nebraska law
banning partial-birth abortions was
unconstitutional. Stenberg was decided
against the legal backdrop of the landmark
Roe v. Wade decision and its 1992
affirmation in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
Together, Roe and Casey provide women
with the right to an abortion until viability,
the point at which a child born prematurely
has a chance of survival. Generally
speaking, states are free to ban abortions
after the point of viability as long as their
statutes carve out exceptions for pregnancies
that endanger a woman's life or health.
The Court found Nebraska's partial-birth
abortion ban unconstitutional for two
reasons. First, it defined the prohibited
surgical techniques so broadly that it
imposed on a pregnant woman's right to an
abortion prior to viability. Second, it
provided no exception allowing partial-birth
abortions to preserve the health of the
mother after viability.
Stenberg is the precedent against which the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act will be
judged. Thus, the drafters of the legislation
tried to ensure that it would not be found
unconstitutional for the same reasons that
the Nebraska law was struck down. The
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act defines the
proscribed procedure with greater specificity
than the Nebraska law did. The dispositive
point in Stenberg about interference with a
woman's right to an abortion before viability
shouldn't be an issue here. The real issue is
whether the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act
will be struck down because, like the
Nebraska statute, it lacks an exception
allowing for partial-birth abortions to
preserve the health of the mother.
The lack of a health exception was no
drafting error. Social conservatives worry
that, as Justice Thomas wrote in his
Stenberg dissent, a health exception
"entirely swallows the rule" by allowing
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sympathetic doctors to make bogus findings
of health necessity. In explaining why it
includes no health exception, the Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act itself makes a fairly
sophisticated legal argument.
The Act explains that when Stenberg held
that partial-birth abortions would be the
safest procedure for pregnant women in
some instances, the Court was required to
defer to the trial court's holdings on the
matter unless they were clearly erroneous. A
finding of fact is clearly erroneous when
"although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed." This is a high
evidentiary bar to clear-but the Congress is
not required to defer to a trial court when
undertaking its own findings of fact.
Thus, the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act
lays out Congress' factual findings, and
concludes that "the great weight of evidence
presented at the Stenberg trial and other
trials challenging partial-birth abortion bans,
as well as at extensive Congressional
hearings, demonstrates that a partial-birth
abortion is never necessary to preserve the
health of a woman, poses significant health
risks to a woman upon whom the procedure
is performed, and is outside of the standard
of medical care." The Act then lists several
cases holding that the Supreme Court is
required to defer to congressional findings.
In trying to determine what the Court will
decide in Gonzales v. Carhart, most
observers have focused on the probable
votes of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito. This singular focus may be misplaced,
as Justices Breyer and Kennedy-who
previously weighed in on partial-birth
abortion in the Stenberg case-may have a
surprise or two in store.
Although Justice Breyer wrote the Stenberg
opinion and is generally regarded as a liberal
vote, the present case touches on a legal
issue about which he has forcefully written.
At the heart of the debate over whether the
federal ban is unconstitutional for lack of a
health exception is the question of whose
fact findings should be trusted: those of the
district court in Stenberg, or those of the
U.S. Congress? In his 2001 dissent in Board
of Trustees v. Garrett, Justice Breyer
delivered a vigorous statement in support
judicial deference to congressional findings
of fact in a different legal context:
There is simply no reason to require
Congress, seeking to determine facts
relevant to the exercise of its
[legislative authority pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment], to adopt
rules or presumptions that reflect a
court's institutional limitations.
Unlike courts, Congress can readily
gather facts from across the Nation,
assess the magnitude of a problem,
and more easily find an appropriate
remedy.... Unlike courts, Congress
directly reflects public attitudes and
beliefs, enabling Congress better to
understand where, and to what
extent, refusals to accommodate a
disability amount to behavior that is
callous or unreasonable to the point
of lacking constitutional justification.
Unlike judges, Members of Congress
can directly obtain information from
constituents who have first-hand
experience with discrimination and
related issues. Moreover, unlike
judges, Members of Congress are
elected.
Justice Breyer noted that Congress is not to
be bound by the same standards and
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presumptions applied in the courts. The
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act makes the
same point: Although the Supreme Court
was bound by the findings of the trial court,
Congress, in crafting policy, is not. Justice
Breyer-who recently authored Active
Liberty, a book that is in part devoted to
defending judicial deference to
congressional decision-making-may well
agree.
While Justice Breyer may surprise in one
direction, Justice Kennedy may surprise in
the other. He has played a central role in the
Court's abortion jurisprudence, surprising
conservatives in Casey by voting to affirm
the constitutional right to an abortion
established in Roe v. Wade. Nonetheless, the
practice of partial-birth abortion seems too
much for Justice Kennedy. He voted to
uphold the Nebraska law at issue in
Stenberg in a dissent that vividly details
what actually happens in a partial-birth
abortion, and describes it as "a procedure
many decent and civilized people find so
abhorrent as to be among the most serious of
crimes against human life."
The conventional wisdom is that Justice
Kennedy will vote to uphold the federal ban,
and while the conventional wisdom is
probably correct, the doctrine of stare
decisis (which holds that prior decisions
should almost always be applied in
subsequent cases) creates at least some
doubt. Justice Kennedy has established
himself as a strong defender of stare decisis,
as his decision in Casey constitutes the most
vigorous public defense of the doctrine in
the past several decades: "The promise of
constancy, once given, binds its maker for as
long as the power to stand by the decision
survives and the understanding of the issue
has not changed so fundamentally as to
render the commitment obsolete. . . . A
willing breach of it would be nothing less
than a breach of faith, and no Court that
broke its faith with the people could sensibly
expect credit for principle in the decision by
which it did that."
Beyond Casey, Justice Kennedy has shown
particular impatience for congressional
attempts to "overrule" the Supreme Court.
The Court addressed an instance of this in
the 1997 City of Boerne v. Flores case,
where it struck down the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993. Essentially, that act
was designed to challenge a prior Court
decision that affirmed a criminal ban on
peyote, a drug used in certain religious
traditions. Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion was unambiguous:
When the political branches of the
Government act against the
background of a judicial
interpretation of the Constitution
already issued, it must be understood
that in later cases and controversies
the Court will treat its precedents
with the respect due them under
settled principles, including stare
decisis, and contrary expectations
must be disappointed. [I]t is this
Court's precedent, not RFRA, which
must control.
Gonzales, then, presents Justice Kennedy
with two difficult questions: Is Stenberg
controlling precedent with respect to the
material issues of law and fact now before
the Court? If so, can he support a departure
from Stenberg?
Even if the court decides that the Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act is unconstitutional
without a health exception, its precise ruling
is complicated by its largely overlooked
decision in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood.
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There, the Court unanimously held that
when an abortion restriction violates a
woman's constitutional rights, the courts
need not strike down the totality of the
statute. Rather, the courts can nullify the
portions of the statute that present
constitutional problems and leave the
remainder in place.
Thus, even if the Court holds that the federal
ban unconstitutionally restricts abortions
necessary to preserve the health of the
mother, it need not nullify the statute in its
entirety. The Court could leave the ban
effective in all cases except the set where the
health or life of the mother is at issue.
But the two most interesting issues that
Gonzales v. Carhart might touch on are not
before the Court in this case. One of these
issues is, of course, the continuing vitality of
Roe v. Wade itself. The Roe line of cases is
the foundation on which the challenge to the
partial-birth abortion ban has been built. If
Roe falls, so too does this challenge. But
Roe's legitimacy is not before the Court in
this case.
Another issue not presented to the Court is
the federalism question: Does Congress
actually have power under the Constitution
to pass this law in the first place, or is this a
state-law concern? While most
conservatives will be unsympathetic to the
abortion-rights argument in Gonzales, they
may have mixed feelings about the
federalism challenge.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has
carefully scrutinized whether Congress has
the constitutional power to enact various
laws. The purpose of doing so is to maintain
limits on Congress' power to legislate
matters more properly regulated by the
states. In this case, the partial-birth abortion
ban was passed pursuant to Congress'
Commerce Clause power. As Glenn
Reynolds and Brannon Denning have
written, the ban may be vulnerable on
federalism grounds: "[I]t would be difficult
for Congress to demonstrate how a medical
procedure-usually regulated by the states-
is 'economic' or 'commercial' in nature or
'substantially affects' interstate commerce.
Given the small number of these procedures
performed each year, it would be hard to
meet the Court's relatively high threshold."
While federalism is not before the Court in
this case, it may form the basis of future
challenges if Gonzales upholds the ban.
Gonzales v. Carhart is an important case to
watch for those who care about the direction
abortion jurisprudence may take. At stake is
the future of partial-birth abortion in the
United States. But the decision may forecast,
at least in part, what the Court will decide in
the coming challenge to Roe v. Wade.
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"The Nebraska Case"
The New York Times
June 29, 2000
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court ruled by a 5-to-4 vote
today that the government cannot prohibit
doctors from performing a procedure that
opponents call partial-birth abortion because
it may be the most medically appropriate
way of terminating some pregnancies.
The decision declared unconstitutional the
Nebraska law before the court and, in effect,
the laws of 30 other states. In addition, the
bill to create a federal ban on the procedure,
which President Clinton has vetoed twice
and which may reach his desk again this
year, would also be unconstitutional under
the court's analysis: like all the other laws, it
does not contain an exception for the health
of the pregnant woman.
The decision, with a majority opinion by
Justice Stephen G. Breyer, was analytically
broader than many people expected, finding
fault not only with the law's concededly
imprecise language, but with the absence of
an exception for women's health. At the
same time, the 5-to-4 vote was unexpectedly
close for a court where support for the
underlying right to abortion has been
counted as 6 to 3.
The combination of the broad ruling and the
close vote led Janet Benshoof, president of
the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy,
which represented the Nebraska doctor who
challenged the law, to describe the day as
one for "Champagne and shivers." The
immediate reaction from politicians and
advocates on both sides of the abortion
debate made it likely that the court's future
composition would be the subject of greater
than usual focus during the remainder of this
election year.
The decision, one of four today that totaled
391 pages, came on the final day of the
court's term.
"Partial-birth abortion" is the term
opponents of abortion use to describe a
method that doctors use infrequently to
terminate pregnancies after about 16 weeks.
Anti-abortion forces coined the term in the
mid-1990's and have focused on graphic
descriptions of the procedure as a way of
undermining public support for abortion.
The ruling today represents a significant
setback to that strategy.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy's dissenting
opinion was a major surprise to both sides of
the abortion debate. Not only his
disagreement with the majority, but also the
terms in which he expressed his views both
in this case and in a second abortion-related
decision today indicated Justice Kennedy's
deep unease with a 1992 decision, of which
he was a joint author, that had reaffirmed the
right to abortion. The second decision
upheld restrictions on demonstrations
outside abortion clinics.
Emphasizing what he described as the
"consequential moral difference" between
the "partial-birth" method and other abortion
procedures, Justice Kennedy said that in its
1997 law, Nebraska "chose to forbid a
procedure many decent and civilized people
find so abhorrent as to be among the most
serious of crimes against human life."
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Justice John Paul Stevens, joined by Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg in an opinion
concurring with the majority, said it was
"simply irrational" to find a fundamental
difference in one procedure over another.
Justice Stevens said it was "impossible for
me to understand how a state has any
legitimate interest in requiring a doctor to
follow any procedure other than the one that
he or she reasonably believes will best
protect the woman" in exercising the
constitutional right to obtain an abortion.
Eight of the nine justices-all but David H.
Souter, who joined Justice Breyer's majority
opinion-wrote opinions in the case,
Stenberg v. Carhart, No. 99-830. In addition
to Justices Souter, Stevens and Ginsburg,
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor joined the
majority opinion. In addition to Justice
Kennedy, Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas wrote dissenting opinions.
In striking down the Nebraska law, the
majority went further than the federal
appeals court whose decision the court
upheld today. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in St. Louis,
had found Nebraska's law unconstitutional
because, while it was ostensibly aimed only
at a particular type of late-term abortion, its
vague wording would chill doctors in
performing a common second-trimester
abortion procedure that undoubtedly had
constitutional protection under the Supreme
Court's precedents.
The Supreme Court agreed with that
analysis but went on to rule that even a more
precisely worded statute that avoided that
problem would still be unconstitutional in
the absence of a health exception.
Surveying medical opinion on the subject,
Justice Breyer said there was a "substantial
likelihood" that the method at issue was "a
safer abortion method in certain
circumstances." He added, "If so, then the
absence of a health exception will place
women at an unnecessary risk of tragic
health consequences."
Justice Breyer called the ruling "a
straightforward application" of the court's
1992 ruling in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, which reaffirmed the 1973 ruling in
Roe v. Wade. But the dissenters disagreed
and said the decision went further in the
direction of protecting an unqualified right
to abortion. Justice Kennedy, an author of
the Casey decision, said the ruling today was
based on a "misunderstanding" of that
decision and "contradicts Casey's assurance
that the state's constitutional position in the
realm of promoting respect for life is more
than marginal."
James Bopp, general counsel of the National
Right to Life Committee, which drafted the
model law on which the Nebraska statute
and many of the others were based, called
the decision a "radical expansion of the right
to abortion."
Under the Nebraska law, a doctor who
performed a "partial-birth abortion" that was
not necessary to save a woman's life faced a
sentence of up to 20 years in prison. The law
was successfully challenged in Federal
District Court in Omaha by Dr. Leroy
Carhart and has never taken effect. Dr.
Carhart and his wife, Mary, were in the
courtroom today.
The statute defined the procedure as "an
abortion procedure in which the person
performing the abortion partially delivers
vaginally a living unborn child before killing
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the unborn child and completing the
delivery." That was defined further to mean
"deliberately and intentionally delivering
into the vagina a living unborn child, or a
substantial portion thereof' before
terminating the pregnancy.
Nebraska's attorney general, Don Stenberg,
argued that the state Legislature meant to
ban one specific procedure, known in the
medical profession as dilation and
extraction, or D & X. In that procedure, used
beginning in about 16 weeks of pregnancy
when the fetus's head has grown too big to
pass safely through an undilated cervix,
doctors seeking to keep the fetus as intact as
possible for various reasons extract it feet
first and then use a sharp instrument to
collapse the fetal skull.
But the lower courts found, and the majority
today agreed, that the statutory definition of
what Nebraska was prohibiting also applied
to a procedure known as dilation and
evacuation, or D & E, which is used much
more commonly for abortions after the first
trimester of pregnancy. In this procedure,
the fetus is dismembered during the
abortion, meaning that a "substantial
portion" of it may be pulled into the vagina
while the fetus is still alive.
In his opinion, Justice Breyer said the court
had to review the statute as it was written,
and did not have authority to accept the
attorney general's invitation to make it
narrower. Consequently, Justice Breyer said,
all doctors using the D & E method "must
fear prosecution, conviction and
imprisonment," making the law an "undue
burden upon a woman's right to make an
abortion decision."
To that extent, the decision tracked the
ruling last year by the Eighth Circuit. Where
the majority today went further was in its
insistence that even a more precisely written
law needed to have an exception to protect
women's health, in addition to the provision
to save the life of the mother, which
Nebraska's law and the other states' laws
have.
Further, Justice Breyer made it clear that the
health exception had to go beyond
"situations where the pregnancy itself
creates a threat to health." He said that
although the medical testimony was
somewhat equivocal, the court accepted the
view that "a statute that altogether forbids D
& X creates a significant health risk" and
would be unconstitutional for that reason
alone.
In the second abortion decision today, the
court ruled 6-to-3 that a Colorado law aimed
at protecting abortion clinic patients and
doctors from harassment by protesters did
not violate the protesters' First Amendment
rights. The decision, Hill v. Colorado, No.
98-1856, upheld a ruling by the Colorado
Supreme Court. Within 100 feet of the
entrance to any health care facility, no one
may make an unwanted approach within
eight feet of another to talk or pass out a
leaflet.
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer. Justices Scalia, Thomas and
Kennedy dissented. Justice Scalia and
Justice Kennedy read their impassioned
dissenting opinions in the courtroom this
morning for more than half an hour, making
clear that this First Amendment debate was
in many respects a proxy for the court's
ongoing abortion debate.
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As far as anyone yet knows, Judge Samuel
A. Alito Jr. has not made any public
declaration calling for the overruling of Roe
v. Wade, the 1973 Supreme Court decision
that recognized a constitutional right to
abortion.
At least on the surface, Alito's record as an
appeals court judge contains something for
everyone. In 1991, he voted to uphold a
Pennsylvania law that would have required
married women to notify their husbands
before getting an abortion. In 1995,
however, he cast a deciding vote on a three-
judge panel to strike down what abortion
rights advocates saw as Pennsylvania's
onerous regulations on federally funded
abortions for victims of incest or rape. And
in 2000, he concurred in a ruling that struck
down a New Jersey ban on the late-term
procedure called partial-birth abortion by
opponents.
Yet for supporters and skeptics, Alito's
record is not ambiguous, and it points
toward the same conclusion: He would
probably vote to strike down Roe. And they
say this for a similar reason: It's not the
results Alito reached in past cases that
matters, it's his legal reasoning.
Alito's dissenting opinion in the 1991 case,
which was later rejected by a 5 to 4 vote of
the Supreme Court, shows "there was a little
bit of interpretation, and more room for him
to apply his own perspective to it," said
Marcia Greenberger, co-president of the
National Women's Law Center, which backs
abortion rights. As a result, she said, his true
anti-Roe colors came through.
As for Alito's vote to strike down
Pennsylvania's rules on abortions funded by
Medicaid, conservatives dismiss that as a
ruling that turned on the finer points of
administrative law. "It can't be characterized
as an abortion ruling on the merits," said Jan
LaRue, chief counsel of Concerned Women
for America, which opposes Roe.
The abortion debate is at the heart of the
incendiary politics surrounding Supreme
Court nominations-and those politics are
heated largely because of Roe itself, which
brought the court into an area that had
previously been the province of state
legislatures.
Strictly speaking, the Roe debate is not
about whether abortion should be legal or
illegal. The Roe decision struck down all
state prohibitions on abortion, so
overturning it would simply make it possible
for states to ban abortion again-but not
mandatory that they do so.
In addition, replacing Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, who supports Roe, with an anti-
Roe justice would not create a majority on
the court for overturning Roe. Rather, the
vote count would still be at least 5 to 4 in
favor of the basic abortion right recognized
in the decision because Justices John Paul
Stevens, Anthony M. Kennedy, David H.
Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen
G. Breyer support it.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. has yet to
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put his view on the record, though his
otherwise conservative background suggests
he would vote to overturn Roe.
In ruling on abortion-related issues that have
come before him as a judge on the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit, Alito
was bound to follow Supreme Court
precedent.
For that reason, abortion rights advocates
tend to discount his ostensibly pro-abortion-
rights rulings, saying that they reflect the
fact that he was tightly constrained by
higher legal authority.
In the 1995 case, Blackwell v. Knoll, the
issue before a panel of three judges was how
far Pennsylvania could go in regulating
abortions paid for by Medicaid.
Congress had forbidden Medicaid from
paying for abortions, except in cases of rape,
incest or a danger to the life of the woman.
Pennsylvania wanted proof that women had
first reported the alleged rape or incest, or,
in the case of a threat to a woman's life, a
certification from a doctor other than the one
about to perform the abortion.
Alito co-signed an opinion by Judge Robert
E. Cowen holding that Pennsylvania's rules
had to yield to a contrary federal policy,
which said states must permit doctors to
waive any such regulations if necessary.
Cowen's opinion decided the case based on
Supreme Court precedents requiring court
deference to reasonable federal agency
interpretations.
Alito's vote is "no surprise," Greenberger
said. "He was operating within these broader
constraints that apply to lower court judges
and don't apply to a Supreme Court justice."
"There is no basis for inferring from this
case anything about how Alito would
approach other cases involving abortion,"
Edward Whelan, president of the
conservative Ethics and Public Policy
Center, wrote in a Web posting defending
Alito's vote.
Conservatives make a similar point in
discounting Alito's vote to strike down the
New Jersey ban on some late-term abortions
in 2000. The issue had just been decided by
the Supreme Court, so the 3rd Circuit had
little choice but to follow precedent.
Alito published an opinion chiding two
judges of the court for publishing a long
opinion, which they had prepared months
earlier but held until the Supreme Court
ruled.
Alito said it "was never necessary and is
now obsolete," because of the Supreme
Court's decision. Some abortion rights
advocates say that remark shows that Alito's
agreement in the decision was grudging, but
conservatives say it merely shows "that he
wanted to state that what the majority had
written was pretty much moot at that point,"
as LaRue puts it.
It is Alito's concurring opinion in the 1991
case, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, that
most intrigues supporters and opponents of
Roe.
For abortion rights advocates, the opinion
shows that, on the one occasion when the
applicable Supreme Court precedent was not
crystal clear, he tried to push the law to the
right-arguing that an ambiguous standard
sketched by O'Connor could be stretched to
permit a state law requiring married women
to notify their husbands before getting an
abortion, unless they could show a threat of
imminent physical harm.
45
"He was interpreting that in the most
constraining way he could, and it would
have resulted in horrible consequences for
women," said Priscilla Smith of the Center
for Reproductive Rights, a New York-based
nonprofit that supports abortion rights. She
said Alito ignored the possibility that
women with abusive husbands might have
faced other threats such as psychological
abuse or physical retaliation against their
other children.
But backers of the judge say that, in
deferring to what he considered reasonable
policy judgments by the legislature, Alito
was exhibiting judicial restraint.
"If you study that case, what you find is a
judge doing his level best to discern the rule
of law," said Charles J. Cooper, a
Washington lawyer who supervised Alito
when both men were officials in the Reagan
administration Justice Department.
Despite the absence of a clear anti-Roe
statement from Alito in that case or any
other, Whelan said, "someone who's shown
the high-quality judging Alito has and is not
ideologically driven to the left will of course
recognize that Roe is an abomination that
has distorted American politics for 30
years."
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The recent disclosure of memos detailing
Supreme Court nominee Samuel A. Alito
Jr.'s opposition to abortion rights as a
Reagan administration lawyer has created a
delicate challenge for the 55-year-old
federal appeals judge.
The White House has tried to reassure
abortion rights Republicans and moderate
Democrats that Alito has an open mind on
abortion by pointing to his 15-year record on
the bench. That record includes two cases in
which he voted to strike down state
limitations on access to abortion, and one in
which he voted to uphold a restriction.
But the new information adds strong
evidence of Alito's personal anti-Roe v.
Wade sentiment to the picture.
Now Alito must explain "the possible
relationship between these documents and
his judicial philosophy, or how his judicial
philosophy is separate from these strong
statements he makes in the documents," said
Michael Gerhardt, a professor of
constitutional law at the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Crucial to Alito's success, legal analysts
said, will be his ability to lay out a
convincing view of stare decisis-the legal
doctrine that says courts should avoid
overturning their past rulings, such as Roe,
the 1973 decision that established a
constitutional right to abortion nationwide.
He made his first attempt at that on Friday,
telling Senate Judiciary Committee
Chairman Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), an abortion
rights supporter, that "when a matter is
embedded in the culture, it's a considerable
factor in the application of stare decisis,"
Specter said at a news conference. Alito said
such reasoning could have implications for
Roe, Specter noted.
As an appeals court judge, Alito was
required to follow Supreme Court precedent.
On the Supreme Court, there would be fewer
restraints on his decision-making, but stare
decisis would be one of them.
Currently, six justices-including Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, whom Alito would
succeed-have voted on the court to support
Roe. Thus, Alito alone could not tip the
balance. If Roe were overturned, abortion
would not be banned; rather, each state
would legislate on the issue as it saw fit.
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. won
confirmation in part because the Senate
accepted his self-description as a "modest"
judge who would approach Roe and
subsequent abortion rights decisions with
respect and caution, whether or not he
thought they were rightly decided.
Ideologically similar to Alito, Roberts had
the advantage of a much skimpier paper trail
on his personal views of Roe. In 1991, he
wrote a brief for the George H.W. Bush
administration that suggested in a footnote
that Roe should be overruled, but Roberts
chalked that up to his role as a lawyer
representing a client.
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Before the disclosure of the memos, Alito
seemed on course to convincing key
senators that he would be like Roberts.
But opponents of the nomination say that
was undermined by Alito's job application
letter to then-Attorney General Edwin
Meese III in 1985, in which Alito said he
was "particularly proud" of helping the
administration argue that the "Constitution
does not protect a right to an abortion."
Alito wrote a strategy memo that same year
to Charles Fried, solicitor general, outlining
an approach to "bringing about the eventual
overruling of Roe v. Wade and, in the
meantime .. . mitigating its effects."
Alito faces the potentially difficult task of
explaining that he is still the man who wrote
the Reagan-era memos, but a man whose
views have been tempered both by his
experience as a judge and by subsequent
developments in the law. And he must do
this without alienating anti-abortion
conservative Republicans.
In Alito's defense, White House officials
have argued that he was merely advising a
client in the memo to Fried, and that the best
predictor of what kind of justice he would be
is his 15-year judicial record. Alito echoed
that point in his meeting with Specter on
Friday.
Of the two arguments, the second is
probably the stronger, legal analysts said. As
a judge, Alito voted in 2000 to strike down a
New Jersey ban on what its opponents call
"partial birth" abortion and, in 1995, to
strike down what abortion rights advocates
saw as Pennsylvania's onerous regulations
on federally funded abortions for victims of
incest or rape. Both times, Alito bowed to
controlling Supreme Court decisions; and in
the 1995 Pennsylvania case, he resisted a
fellow conservative judge's dissenting
opinion that would have upheld the abortion
regulations.
Alito's memos, analysts noted, were written
12 years after Roe was decided and seven
years before the Supreme Court's landmark
1992 reaffirmation of Roe in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey. Today, Roe is much
more deeply entrenched in the law.
"More telling is that as a judge, when it
came time to apply the law, Alito applied
the law," said Peter Berkowitz, an associate
professor of constitutional law at George
Mason University.
Abortion rights advocates and some of their
Senate allies have argued that Alito's 1985
writings prove that he cannot make that
case. They say he has a personal anti-Roe
agenda that showed in his 1991 dissenting
opinion in favor of a Pennsylvania law that
would have required married women to
notify their husbands before getting an
abortion. The Supreme Court rejected his
view by a 5 to 4 vote in 1992.
Alito may not help his cause by trying to
distance himself from the letter to Meese,
Gerhardt said. If Alito vows to follow stare
decisis at his hearings next month, Gerhardt
noted, "Senators can ask, 'Are you simply
saying that just because you're applying for
another job?' "
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"Bush Signs Law Outlawing Some Abortions"
The Seattle Times
November 6, 2003
Seattle Times News Service
President Bush yesterday signed into law the
most significant federal restriction on
abortion in the 30 years since the Supreme
Court's Roe v. Wade decision established
constitutional protection for terminating
pregnancies.
The new law immediately was challenged in
court. A federal judge in Nebraska issued a
narrow restraining order against the law in a
case brought by four doctors, while
abortion-rights supporters challenged the
ban in New York and San Francisco.
The new prohibition is for a relatively
uncommon procedure known in the medical
profession as "intact dilation and extraction"
but referred to by opponents as "partial-birth
abortion." Still, both sides in the debate
viewed it as a symbolic shift by the
government against abortion after an eight-
year legislative struggle and two vetoes by
former President Clinton.
"America stands for liberty, for the pursuit
of happiness and for the unalienable right of
life," Bush said to a cheering crowd in the
Ronald Reagan Building before a signing
ceremony that honored the men who
shepherded the legislation through
Congress. "This right to life cannot be
granted or denied by government, because it
does not come from government; it comes
from the creator of life."
Those in the invitation-only audience
included Attorney General John Ashcroft,
Roman Catholic Cardinal Edward Egan of
New York, House Republican Leader Tom
DeLay of Texas, and dozens of anti-abortion
activists.
In an indication of the potential sweep of the
new law, Ashcroft assigned responsibility
for enforcing it to the Justice Department's
civil-rights division rather than its criminal
division. Officials said the decision,
revealed to prosecutors yesterday, broadens
the civil-rights protection of fetuses but
creates a potential conflict of interest for the
civil-rights division's criminal section. That
section also is responsible for prosecuting
those who block access to abortion clinics.
The law makes it a crime, punishable by up
to two years in prison, to abort a "partially
delivered living fetus," except to save the
pregnant woman's life. Women who
undergo the procedure wouldn't be subject
to prosecution, but their husbands or their
parents, in cases involving minors, could sue
the doctor for damages.
Bush, anticipating legal challenges, won an
extended ovation from abortion foes when
he vowed to fight the lawsuits.
"The facts about partial-birth abortion are
troubling and tragic, and no lawyer's brief
can make them seem otherwise," he said.
"The executive branch will vigorously
defend this law against any who would try to
overturn it in the courts."
The law bars doctors from an "overt act,"
such as puncturing the skull, to kill a
partially delivered fetus. Supporters say the
procedure often is the safest way to abort a
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badly deformed fetus in the late stages of a
pregnancy. The ban has an exception to
protect a woman's life but not her health,
which Congress determined was
unnecessary. The Supreme Court three years
ago struck down a similar law in Nebraska,
but architects of the federal ban said they
have taken into account the court's
objections.
Bush has said the nation is not ready for a
more comprehensive abortion ban, but
abortion opponents were optimistic.
"President Bush's signing of the Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act marks the first time
in three decades that our nation has placed
any restriction on an abortion procedure,"
said Archbishop Charles Chaput, chairman
of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops'
Committee for Pro-Life Activities. "This is a
vital step in the right direction."
Abortion-rights advocates were equally
sweeping in their denunciations. "Today
George W. Bush sends a message to every
woman and girl in the United States: Your
reproductive rights are not guaranteed," said
Kim Gandy, president of the National
Organization for Women (NOW). "By
signing the deceptively named Partial Birth
Abortion Ban into law, Bush confirms that
his administration and Congress have both
the power and the will to overturn Roe v.
Wade one step at a time."
A protest by NOW produced a modest
turnout. A few dozen demonstrators could
be seen holding signs with messages such as
"Keep Abortion Legal" as Bush's motorcade
traveled to the Reagan building for the brief
ceremony.
Democratic presidential candidates, all of
whom support abortion rights, issued
statements denouncing the new law.
Opponents of the ban have turned their
efforts to the judiciary. Less than an hour
after the signing, U.S. District Judge
Richard Kopf in Lincoln, Neb., issued a
temporary injunction and said his order
would apply only to the four doctors who
filed the lawsuit, but the ruling could extend
beyond Nebraska because they are licensed
in Alabama, Georgia, Iowa, New York,
South Carolina and Virginia. Kopf took
issue with the lack of an exception in the
law to protect a woman's health the grounds
Clinton cited in vetoing similar legislation.
"While it is also true that Congress found
that a health exception is not needed, it is, at
the very least, problematic whether I should
defer to such a conclusion when the
Supreme Court has found otherwise," the
judge said.
In Manhattan, U.S. District Judge Richard
Casey appeared skeptical about arguments
by Talcott Camp, a lawyer for the American
Civil Liberties Union, which sought an order
blocking enforcement. Casey did not issue
an immediate order.
"Doesn't the court have to give some
deference to the findings of Congress that
are spelled out in this statute?" Casey asked,
noting the findings resulted from eight years
of hearings. "They say there is no threat."
In the Reagan building, there was extended
cheering for Bush.
"For years, a terrible form of violence has
been directed against children who are
inches from birth while the law looked the
other way," the president said, standing
before a bank of flags. "Today, at last, the
American people and our government have
confronted the violence and come to the
defense of the innocent child."
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"Senate Approves Bill to Prohibit Type of Abortion"
The New York Times
October 22, 2003
Sheryl Gay Stolberg
The Senate on Tuesday overwhelmingly
approved the first federal ban on a specific
abortion procedure, ending eight years of
divisive debate and clearing the way for
President Bush to sign the measure into law.
Both sides declared the 64-to-34 vote a
historic turning point in a controversy that
has split Americans for decades, ever since
the Supreme Court established a
constitutional right to abortion in the case of
Roe v. Wade 30 years ago.
"The legislation we just passed will save
lives," Senator Bill Frist, the majority leader
and a surgeon, said after the vote. "We have
just outlawed a procedure that is barbaric,
that is brutal, that is offensive to our moral
sensibilities and it is out of the mainstream
of the ethical practice of medicine today."
Opponents of the bill, saying it is
unconstitutional, vowed to challenge it in
court as soon as Mr. Bush signs it. But the
president, who is traveling in Asia, said he
looked forward to the signing ceremony and
called the measure "very important
legislation that will end an abhorrent
practice and continue to build a culture of
life in America."
Legal experts question whether the measure,
which prohibits an "overt act" to "kill the
partially delivered living fetus," will hold up
in court.
Three years ago, the Supreme Court rejected
a similar law in Nebraska, saying its
language was so broad as to outlaw more
than one type of abortion and that it was
unconstitutional because it lacked an
exception for the health of the mother.
Opponents make that same argument about
the federal bill.
"Congress has turned its back on America's
women, their right to privacy, the right to
choose," said Senator Tom Harkin,
Democrat of Iowa. "America's women are
now second-class citizens."
Seventeen Democrats joined with 47
Republicans to give final passage to the bill,
which outlaws a procedure that doctors call
intact dilation and extraction but critics call
partial-birth abortion. The vote came after
emotional and often graphic debate.
At one point, Senator Mike DeWine,
Republican of Ohio, read an account written
by a nurse who had witnessed the procedure
and was horrified by it. At another, Senator
Sam Brownback, Republican of Kansas,
showed a photograph of a 21-week-old fetus
he said had been spared an abortion by
doctors who operated, in the womb, to
correct a birth defect.
"Is little Samuel's hand the hand of a
person," he said, pointing to the photograph,
"or is it the hand of a piece of property?" To
which Senator Barbara Boxer, a California
Democrat who is the bill's chief opponent,
replied: "I am not a doctor, and I am not
God. I trust other human beings to make
these decisions."
Tuesday's action by the Senate ends the long
and tortured legislative history of the ban,
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which was passed by Congress twice before,
but vetoed both times by President Bill
Clinton. This year, with Republicans
controlling both houses of Congress and the
White House, abortion opponents, who
began pressing for the ban in 1995, knew
victory would be assured.
The measure passed both the House and
Senate earlier this year, but got hung up
because the Senate version included
language, opposed by the House, that
reaffirmed lawmakers' support for the Roe
decision. The language was stripped from
the bill in conference, and the House gave
final passage to the measure on Oct. 2, 281
to 142.
But in the Senate, advocates of the right to
abortion, led by Ms. Boxer, insisted on one
more day of debate before final passage.
They characterized the bill as an assault on
the right to privacy established by the Roe
case, and an intrusion into the ability of
doctors and patients to make their own
medical choices.
"This is a bad package for the families of
America," Ms. Boxer said. "I know the
handwriting is on the wall, and that it will
pass, but the issue is not going away."
Indeed, three groups say they will file suit to
block the law from taking effect. They are
the Center for Reproductive Rights, an
advocacy group in New York that brought
the Nebraska case; the Planned Parenthood
Federation of America; and the National
Abortion Federation, which represents 400
centers that provide more than half the 1.2
million abortions performed in this country
each year.
The American Civil Liberties Union will
represent the abortion federation in its suit.
The bill defines the procedure as one in
which the person performing the abortion
"deliberately and intentionally vaginally
delivers a living fetus until, in the case of a
head-first presentation, the entire fetal head
is outside the body of the mother, or, in the
case of breech presentation, any part of the
fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body
of the mother, for the purpose of performing
an overt act that the person knows will kill
the partially delivered living fetus."
Under the measure, anyone violating the ban
would be subject to two years in prison and
unspecified fines.
"This bill puts doctors in the untenable
position of choosing the best and most
appropriate care for their patients or risk
going to jail," said Vicki Saporta, the
abortion federation's president. Of the
Senate vote, she said, "It will be a very
short-lived victory. The bill will be enjoined
and will not become law."
Legal experts tend to agree. David J.
Garrow, a professor of law at Emory
University who is an expert in abortion case
law, said, "The absence of an all-
encompassing health exception means this is
D.O.A."
But the Congressional authors of the bill say
they have addressed the Supreme Court's
concerns, by making the language of the ban
more specific, and by including
Congressional "findings of fact" that suggest
the procedure they are trying to outlaw is
never medically necessary.
"If your concern is women's health, then you
would be for banning this procedure,"
Senator Rick Santorum, the Pennsylvania
Republican and lead Senate sponsor of the
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measure, said in Senate debate today.
Mr. Garrow said courts were likely to
disregard such Congressional
pronouncements.
But proponents of the ban say the legal
climate may change, particularly if Mr. Bush
wins re-election. They are hopeful that, by
the time the case reaches the Supreme Court,
Mr. Bush will have had an opportunity to
appoint new justices, and the slim 5-to-4
majority that rejected the Nebraska law will
no longer hold together.
"It would only require the change in one
mind, or the change in one justice, so that
those on the other side who make confident
predictions aren't as confident," said
Douglas Johnson, a spokesman for the
National Right to Life Committee, which
has spent years fighting for the ban.
Of the Nebraska case, Mr. Johnson said,
"Congress is now inviting the Supreme
Court to re-examine that extreme and
inhumane decision."
The Senate's votes, and Mr. Bush's signing
of the bill, will undoubtedly have political
ramifications for the 2004 presidential race.
Already, the National Abortion Rights
Action League, an advocacy group, is
planning television advertisements
criticizing the Bush administration as
interfering with the right to privacy.
Meanwhile, Planned Parenthood is planning
a major rally for next April.
"This is not unexpected," Gloria Feldt, the
organization's president, said in a telephone
interview, referring to the Senate vote, "but
it's also a good time to recognize what a
historic day this is. This is the first time that
the White House and both houses of
Congress have been aligned in lockstep and
ready to take away reproductive choice."
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When the Supreme Court invalidated state
laws three years ago that banned a
controversial procedure known as partial-
birth abortion, the justices handed legislators
a road map of sorts for drafting new statutes.
In the court's 5-4 majority opinion, and in a
separate opinion by Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, the justices indicated they would
approve laws that were narrowly written to
ban only a specific procedure and included
an exception that allowed doctors to perform
the procedure if the woman's health dictated
it.
But the legislation Congress sent to
President Bush late Tuesday doesn't clearly
do either. Although supporters say they are
optimistic it will pass constitutional scrutiny,
the ban provides obvious grounds for legal
challenges from doctors.
Several doctors and organizations have
vowed to file suit to block the federal ban as
soon as the president signs it into law,
including Dr. LeRoy Carhart, who
successfully challenged a Nebraska ban
before the Supreme Court in 2000.
"We will file suit as soon as the president
signs the bill seeking as broad an injunction
as possible to protect women and doctors
throughout the country," said Nancy
Northup, president of the Center for
Reproductive Rights, which represents
Carhart.
The bill approved Tuesday is Congress'
response to the court's bitterly divided
decision three years ago in Carhart's case.
Douglas Johnson, legislative director of the
National Right to Life Committee, said that
in passing the federal ban, Congress was
"inviting the court to re-examine that
extreme and inhumane decision."
The 2000 Supreme Court decision
invalidated Nebraska's ban on the so-called
partial-birth abortion procedure and up to 30
similar state laws, including one in Illinois.
Most of the state laws closely resembled
Nebraska's broadly written statute, which
could encompass other forms of abortion
beyond the "partial-birth" procedure. Most
of the state laws also did not include
provisions that allowed doctors to perform
the procedure to protect a woman's health.
Defects Unconstitutional
The Supreme Court said those defects in the
Nebraska law made it unconstitutional.
O'Connor, who provided the critical fifth
vote, wrote separately to emphasize that the
Nebraska statute was unconstitutional
because it did not contain a health exception
for the woman and wasn't specifically
targeted at a procedure known medically as
dilation and extraction, or D&X.
Northup said the federal legislation passed
Tuesday has the "exact same two flaws" the
Supreme Court found in the Nebraska case
and is "drafted with language that would
cover abortion as early as 12 weeks of
pregnancy."
The bill does not use the medical term, as
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suggested by O'Connor, and instead refers to
the procedure as "partial-birth abortion," just
as the state laws did. Supporters of the
legislation, however, say Congress
addressed O'Connor's concerns by providing
more detail on the type of procedure at
issue.
Despite O'Connor's guidance, the bill lacks a
health exception that would allow doctors to
perform the procedure if a pregnant
woman's health were at risk, and instead
insists that there's no evidence that the
procedure at issue is ever safer for the
woman.
Jay Sekulow, chief counsel of the American
Center for Law and Justice, a conservative
advocacy group, said he was "cautiously
optimistic" that the bill approved Tuesday
would address O'Connor's concerns,
although he said he won't "pretend for a
moment to think that any of these cases are
easy before the Supreme Court."
A Clearer Definition
He noted that although the legislation
doesn't use medical terminology, it more
clearly defines the procedure at issue than
did the state bans.
"The key difference and, hopefully, the
difference in the Supreme Court-because
that's where this ultimately is going to end
up-is the definition of the procedure is very
specific and very clear," Sekulow said.
"Obviously, the pivotal vote on this, at
right now, is Justice O'Connor.
phraseology and terms used in the
statute are designed to meet her concerns."
Sekulow said anti-abortion advocates did
not want a health exception in the federal
law because they believed it would create a
large loophole for doctors to continue
performing the procedure. Sekulow said the
health exceptions have been interpreted to
give doctors the ability to perform the
procedure for any health reason.
"The concern within the pro-life community
is that [the exception] is so broadly defined,
has been so broadly utilized, that it would
become a meaningless statute," he said.
Groups' Motives Questioned
But the absence of the health exception
prompted Northup to question the motives
of anti-abortion groups and legislators who
urged Congress to pass the legislation. She
suggested they were not trying to draft a
constitutional bill, but instead were "about
energizing their anti-choice political base."
Sekulow acknowledged that the anti-
abortion movement "needed to get
something through Congress that would be a
pro-life victory" and that it believed this bill
was the best option with a closely divided
Senate.
But he said he long has urged legislators to
pass a bill that has a realistic chance of
being successfully defended.
"Getting it through the House and Senate
and then having it struck as unconstitutional









With the 30th anniversary of Roe v. Wade
approaching and Republicans in control in
Washington, the 108th Congress will likely
take up the partial-birth abortion ban passed
by the House last July but buried by the
Democratic Senate.
"It will be an issue. It will be taken up," says
Douglas Johnson, top lobbyist for the
National Right to Life Committee. "I expect
to see the Senate deal with it in the new
year."1
He expects the new bill to be identical to the
one that passed the House last summer. That
bill featured two changes from previous
bills-changes that respond to the U.S.
Supreme Court's ruling in Stenberg v.
Carhart, which overturned a Nebraska law
banning the procedure.
The first change is the bill's definition of
partial-birth abortion. The majority opinion
in Stenberg found Nebraska's definition of
"partial-birth abortion" was too vague and
concluded it could be interpreted to cover
not only abortions in which the baby is
partially delivered alive before being killed,
but also the "dilation and evacuation"
method, in which an unborn baby is
dismembered while still inside the mother.
The five-justice majority in Stenberg
supported this method.
To avoid any new claims of confusion, the
new bill will explicitly define partial-birth
abortion as follows: "The person performing
the abortion deliberately and intentionally
delivers a living fetus until, in the case if a
head-first presentation, the entire fetal head
is outside of the body of the mother, or, in
the case of breech delivery, any part of the
fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body
of the mother."
The second change addresses the "health of
the mother" issue. The Court ruled in
Stenberg that an abortionist must be able to
use partial-birth abortion if it is the method
least likely to cause side effects for the
mother. The majority reached this result by
referring to the findings of late-term
abortionist Dr. LeRoy Carhart, who asserted
that late-term partial-birth abortion is
sometimes the method least likely to cause
deleterious side effects.
The new bill will tackle this issue by
incorporating congressional findings that
partial-birth abortion is never necessary to
protect a mother's health and that it may in
fact expose a woman to substantial health
risks. The bill reads:
Congress finds that partial-birth
abortion is never medically indicated
to preserve the health of the mother;
is in fact unrecognized as a valid
abortion procedure by the
mainstream medical community;
poses additional health risks to the
mother; blurs the line between
abortion and infanticide in the killing
of a partially born child just inches
from birth; and confuses the role of
the physician in childbirth and
should therefore be banned.
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The National Right to Life Committee is
optimistic about the future of a partial-birth
abortion ban. Johnson has said that an early
tally shows that 62 incoming senators would
support it. And a letter to members of
Congress from the NRLC expresses hope
that the new bill could satisfy swing-voter
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's concern that
the dilation and evacuation procedure should






Three days ago, the U.S. Supreme Court
announced that it would review the
constitutionality of the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act. The announcement
signaled a possible rescue of the law, which
had been struck down by appellate courts.
Pro-lifers rejoiced. Pro-choicers fumed. The
press saw it as a possible turning point in the
campaign to overturn Roe v. Wade.
Here's a different way to think about the
case. It isn't about whether you're for or
against abortion. It's about how confident
you are that an unwelcome medical scenario
will never happen.
The ban has become so politically central to
the abortion debate that it's easy to forget
how medically marginal it is. At most, it
would affect fewer than one in 250 U.S.
abortions. Of these 2,000 to 5,000 unborn
babies-if that's what you believe they
are-it would save none. It doesn't ban
abortions beyond a stage of pregnancy; it
just regulates the methods by which they're
done.
Despite this, maybe because of it, many pro-
choice politicians are willing to accept the
ban. If you can end a pregnancy safely by
other means, it seems gratuitously revolting
to partially extract the fetus during the
procedure. But that's a big if. What pro-
choicers demand, and pro-lifers reject, is an
exception to allow this method in situations
where it's ostensibly necessary to protect the
woman's health. According to the National
Right to Life Committee, "the vast majority
of partial-birth abortions do not involve any
acute medical circumstances." So, in theory,
the dispute is confined to a fraction of a
fraction of all abortions.
Because the justifying scenarios are
exceptional, and because the rationales for
the procedure are technical, the federal
judge who heard testimony in this case
issued an opinion short on generalizations
and long on details. His opinion runs 474
pages. It spends 57 pages reviewing
congressional testimony over a nine-year
period and another 278 pages reviewing
medical testimony at the trial. It discusses
numerous health conditions that, according
to doctors who testified, make partial-birth
abortion possibly the safest procedure for
the woman. It concludes, "The trial evidence
establishes that a large and eminent body of
medical opinion believes that partial-birth
abortions provide women with significant
health benefits in certain circumstances."
Not all circumstances just certain ones.
The appeals court opinion affirming this
ruling takes similar care. It enumerates
scenarios in which testimony and logic
indicate that partial-birth abortion might be
the safest procedure. It acknowledges
contrary testimony but concludes, "If one
thing is clear from the record in this case, it
is that no consensus exists in the medical
community." Quoting a six-year-old
Supreme Court opinion, it warns that "the
division of medical opinion about the matter
at most means uncertainty, a factor that
signals the presence of risk, not its absence."
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The ban's authors in Congress, like its
defenders in the Bush administration, show
no such humility. The nine years of
congressional testimony that took 57 pages
to describe in the trial court's opinion are
boiled down in the ban's text to five pages.
Every inconvenient nuance, witness
statement, or piece of evidence is
obliterated. The word "never" appears 10
times. "Congress finds that partial-birth
abortion is never medically indicated to
preserve the health of the mother," says the
law, offering no details. "These findings
reflect the very informed judgment of the
Congress that a partial-birth abortion is
never necessary to preserve the health of a
woman." Who needs information when
you've got informed judgment? Who needs
sometimes when you've got never?
In its brief in defense of the law, the Bush
administration adopts the same attitude. It
crafts a list of legal precedents designed to
cow judges into accepting the ban's
"findings" instead of trial evidence. The
precedents involve the economics of
television stations; the sophistication of
high-school administrators in interpreting
legislation; the ability of volunteers to staff
non-combat military jobs; and limits on
attorneys' fees in claims for veterans'
benefits. It's a telling list, full of one-size-
fits-all policies. Three times, the brief quotes
a line that says Congress deserves deference
because it's "better equipped to amass and
evaluate the vast amounts of data bearing on
such an issue." But vast data-crunching isn't
what's needed here. What's needed is
sensitivity to variable particulars.
The administration cites four cases that
purportedly validate deference to Congress
''on issues of medical or scientific
judgment." Two of the cases pertain to
treatment of people who have previously
committed crimes, which begs the question
of whether partial-birth abortion should be
criminalized. In the third case, which was
decided during Prohibition, the
administration's brief notes that the Supreme
Court "deferred to an 'implicit congressional
finding' that alcohol had no medicinal uses."
The administration conveys no
acknowledgment, much less embarrassment,
that medical evidence now shows this
finding to be wrong. In the fourth case, the
court upheld a congressional finding that X-
rays were too crude to catch all instances of
a disability-related disease. The finding was
upheld because it rejected, not imposed, a
glib medical generalization.
The argument made by pro-lifers against a
health exception is that doctors will interpret
it too broadly. Maybe so. But whom do you
trust less: Doctors who apply the exception
too broadly, or politicians who categorically
dismiss it? As the doctors challenging the
ban observe, Congress has no "particular
expertise" in medicine. Only 11 of its 535
members are doctors, and only one has
performed abortions. If doctors err in using
partial-birth abortion when they should rely
on a different procedure, the number of
additional fetuses killed is zero. But if
lawmakers err in ruling it out, every case
they screw up is a woman subjected to
medical risk.
Unlike Congress, the appeals court that
affirmed the necessity of this procedure
didn't purport to close the question. This is
not to say, however, that because the
Supreme Court concluded "substantial
medical authority" supported the need for a
health exception in 2000, legislatures are
forever constitutionally barred from enacting
partial-birth abortion bans. Rather, the
"substantial medical authority" test allows
for the possibility that the evidentiary
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support underlying the need for a health
exception might be reevaluated under
appropriate circumstances. Medical
technology and knowledge is constantly
advancing, and it remains theoretically
possible that at some point (either through
an advance in knowledge or the
development of new techniques, for
example), the procedures prohibited by the
Act will be rendered obsolete. Should that
day ever come, legislatures might then be
able to rely on this new evidence to prohibit
partial-birth abortions without providing a
health exception.
That's the kind of open-minded caution you
need to adjudicate complex medical
questions. And that, not life or choice, is the
crucial question in the partial-birth abortion
case. Which party in the dispute has more
expertise? Which takes more care? Which
shows more humility? By any of those
standards, the doctors and judges put the
politicians to shame.
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"Partial-birth Gets Full Court"
The Wall Street Journal
March 4, 2006
Cathleen Cleaver Ruse
Partial-birth abortion is returning to the
nation's highest court-but the cast, script
and scene are different. All eyes will be
focused on the new justices, one of whom
sits in the place of Sandra Day O'Connor,
who cast the swing vote nullifying
Nebraska's ban on the procedure in 2000.
Justice Samuel Alito previously voted down
Pennsylvania's law against partial-birth
abortion on the grounds that it did not square
with the Supreme Court's ruling in Stenberg
v. Carhart. He is no longer bound by
precedent. For Chief Justice John Roberts,
this will be his first judicial review of the
subject.
Also different is that the court will consider
a law passed by a co-equal branch of the
government, complete with findings of fact
based on expert testimony from 46
physicians over the course of eight years.
This raises the bar, and the issue as to what
extent the court will defer to these
congressional findings of fact.
This time around the procedure is also
defined with more precision. Nebraska
defined it as killing a living unborn child
after partially delivering "a substantial
portion" of the child, which the court found
impermissibly vague. The Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act defines it as killing a child
after "any part of the fetal trunk past the
navel is outside of the body of the mother"-
a much clearer, if morbid, definition.
But the most profound difference is that now
there is a genuine trial record. In Stenberg,
the factual question of the procedure's
medical necessity, a point made absolutely
central by the court in its ruling, was based
on scant evidence-little more than the
claims of Dr. Leroy Carhart, the plaintiff.
Today, there are thousands of pages of
testimony and evidence from three trials on
the federal ban. Not since Roe v. Wade has
so much information about the practice of
abortion been available in the public record,
under oath, and by doctors who perform the
procedure themselves.
To be sure, the record is incomplete. A
central claim by the parties challenging the
ban is that the partial-birth abortion is safer
than other procedures in some
circumstances. True? The Department of
Justice sought hard evidence from the
medical records of the plaintiffs' experts, but
its subpoenas were refused. The doctors said
the records were in the control of the
hospitals, and the hospitals refused to
produce them under a novel claim of
"abortion records" privilege-even though
DOJ agreed to have identifying information
redacted. In the end, the medical records
were not produced.
Plenty was produced, however, that should
be of interest in the court of public opinion.
A decade ago the pro-choice movement had
convinced much of America that partial-
birth abortion was a figment of the pro-life
imagination. Today we can read, for
example, the sworn testimony of a medical
doctor relating his eyewitness account of the
procedure, including how the practitioners
"delivered the fetus intact until the head was
still trapped behind the cervix, and then they
reached up and crushed the head."
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Most of the testimony is first-person. One
doctor explains how to "capture the head
within the opening of the forceps and then
crush the head using external force,"
admitting that the child is still living before
its skull is crushed. Another is asked if he
ever notices the baby's fingers opening and
closing at this point. "I don't think I have
ever looked at the hands." "Were the feet
moving?" "Feet could be moving, yes."
One physician explained her opposition to
the new law this way: "I mean, I know what
my purpose is . .. to empty the uterus in the
safest way possible. Yet, this language
implies that I have this other purpose, which
is to kill the fetus. So, to me, it's like-kind
of like there is an elephant in the room
besides me and my patient . . . there is
somebody judging what my purpose is in
bringing the fetus out a certain way." Well,
doctor, you are quite right, and that's the
reason Congress and dozens of states have
passed laws against partial-birth abortion.
Also part of the public record are three
federal trials challenging the federal ban.
One, in the Eastern District of New York,
involved a suit brought by the National
Abortion Federation and a group of
physicians. Judge Richard Conway Casey (a
Clinton appointee), heard 16 days of expert
testimony about whether partial birth
abortion is ever medically necessary or
beneficial.
Government witnesses included Dr. Steven
Clark, an obstetrician and specializes in
maternal fetal medicine, who testified that
there are no medical conditions for which
partial-birth abortion would be necessary to
preserve the health of the mother. Other
government witnesses concurred. In his
ruling, Judge Casey described this testimony
as "highly credible and reasoned." By
contrast, much of the testimony by plaintiffs'
witnesses was not credible in Judge Casey's
view. Their claims, he wrote, were merely
"theoretical," sometimes "false," and often
did not "rise above the realm of the
hypothetical."
Nevertheless, the ban was ruled
unconstitutional by Judge Casey and all
other lower court judges based upon the
standard voiced by the five member majority
in Stenberg v. Carhart: Where there is a
"division of medical opinion" about the
relative safety of an abortion method, a
health exception is required. What this
standard actually means, therefore, is that a
"belief' that a procedure "may bring with it"
safety advantages for "some patients" is
sufficient; no proof is necessary. Plaintiffs
need only toss about unproven and even
improvable hypothetical claims to defeat the
law.
Justice Antonin Scalia, dissenting in
Stenberg, said the standard does no more
than require "an abortionist to assure himself
that, in his expert medical judgment, this
method is, in the case at hand, marginally
safer than others." Justice Anthony
Kennedy, who has voted to uphold Roe v.
Wade, also dissented, writing that the
majority's standard gives abortion doctors "a
veto power" over a state legislature's
judgment that partial birth abortions should
not be performed. "[I]t is now Dr. Leroy
Carhart who sets abortion policy for the
state of Nebraska, not the legislature or the
people," he wrote.
Will the Stenberg "abortionist's veto" live on
in Gonzales v. Carhart? If it does, then all
that will have been required to defeat the
will of Congress-and, by extension, the
American people-is for abortion doctors to
toe the party line.
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